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COMMENTS

DEWEY v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO.*: A
WELCOME EXERCISE OF RESTRAINT IN
APPLYING PREEMPTION DOCTRINE TO STATE
TORT ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION

The period from 1984 to 1988 witnessed a dramatic increase
in the number of cases in which plaintiffs attempted to hold cigarette manufacturers liable for injuries and deaths allegedly
caused by cigarette use.1 This so-called "second wave" of tobacco litigation2 was spearheaded in large part by the widely
publicized efforts of the plaintiffs' attorneys in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.3 The plaintiffs brought a variety of claims
121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990).
See Jacobson, After Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.. How Wide Will the Floodgates of CigaretteLitigation Open?, 38 Am UL Rsv. 1021, 1036 (1989) (few cigarette
product liability cases were filed during the 19703); Plum, Anti-Smoking Cause Gets
Infusion of New Blood, Nat'1 L.J., Oct. 30, 1989, at 1 (the number of cases against cigarette manufacturers peaked in July 1987, when there were 149 cases pending); Wermeil,
Supreme Court Will Consider Tobacco Issue, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1991, at A3, col. 1 (as
of March 1991, the number of smoker death cases has dwindled to approximately 45).
2 Edell, CigaretteLitigation: The Second /Wave, 22 Tonr & INs. LJ. 90 (1986) (arguing that current developments in tort liability law and greater cooperation among
plaintiffs' counsel will help plaintiffs prevail in cigarette liability cases). But cf. Crist &
Majoras, The 'New" Wave in Smoking and Health Litigation-IsAnything Really So
New?, 54 TENN. L, REV. 551 (1987) (predicting that the recent spate of tobacco liability
suits are going to fail in the same fashion as the suits that were brought in the 19503 and
1960s).
1 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), reu'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1043 (1987), on remand, 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986), laterproceeding, 683
F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988), affd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111
S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
The Cipollone case and the plaintiffs' attorney, Marc Edell, attracted substantial
attention in the national media and legal community. See Mlintz & Gladwell, Legal Battle Between Tobacco Firms,Opponents Won't End Anytime Soon, Wash. Po3t, June 15,
*

1
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based on strict liability," negligence, 5 intentional tort' and
breach of warranty.7 However, after a series of rulings on motions by both sides, the district court and the Third Circuit
whittled away at the bulk of the plaintiffs' original causes of action, significantly weakening the potency of the suit.8
1988, at F1, col. 3 (noting that Cipollone has been the most heavily publicized tobacco
case to date); Mintz, Winning Lawyer Hasn't Stopped Fight Against Tobacco Firms,
Wash. Post, June 19, 1988, at H5, col. 2. After Cipollone was filed in 1983, the number of
cases against tobacco manufacturers rose substantially. See Margolick, Antismoking Climate Inspires Suits By The Dying, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1985, at B1, col. 3.
' To recover in strict liability, a plaintiff must show that there exists a defect in the
product that is unreasonably dangerous but does not have to show that the defendant
was negligent in causing the defect. Failure to warn may also constitute a defect. See W.
KE oN, PaOSSER AN KFON ON TORTS § 99 (5th ed. 1984). The plaintiffs' strict liability claims included: 1) a design defect claim alleging that the defendants manufactured a
defectively designed cigarette rather than an alternatively designed cigarette (the "design defect" claim); 2) a second type of design defect claim alleging that the defendants
produced an unsafe and defective product, the risks of which outweighed its utility (the
"risk utility" claim); and 3) a failure to warn claim alleging that the defendants failed to
warn consumers adequately of the dangers associated with cigarette smoking (the "failure to warn" claim). Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1149.
1 The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants negligently failed to warn consumers of the dangers associated with cigarette smoking and negligently advertised their
products so as to neutralize and render ineffective the cigarette label warnings. Id.
* The plaintiffs asserted that the defendants intentionally advertised their products
to neutralize whatever warnings were given ("fraudulent misrepresentation" claim) and
conspired to deprive the public of data indicating that cigarette smoking is hazardous to
health ("conspiracy to defraud" claim). Id. See Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. 664, 673 (D.N.J.
1986), for a fuller explanation of these claims.
I The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants breached express warranties, arising from their advertisements, that the cigarettes they manufactured and sold did not
present any significant health consequences. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1149. Advertisements constitute express warranties if they form part of the basis of the bargain on
which the consumer bought the advertised good. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1987). See Cipollone,
649 F. Supp. 664, 675 (D.N.J. 1986), for a fuller explanation of this claim.
8 See Cipollone, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986); Cipollone 649 F.Supp. 664 (D.N.J.
1986). The paring of the plaintiffs' claims began when the Third Circuit, on an interlocutory appeal, held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (the "Act")
preempted those state law claims that challenged the adequacy of the warnings on ciga.
rette packages or challenged cigarette manufacturers' advertising practices after the
Act's enactment in 1965. 789 F.2d at 187. On remand, the district court interpreted the
Third Circuit's decision to mean that the Act preempted the plaintiffs' failure to warn,
express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy to defraud claims insofar
as they challenged the defendants' advertising, promotional or labeling activities after
the Act's effective date on January 1, 1966. Because Mrs. Cipollone did not smoke
brands manufactured by Philip Morris or Lorillard prior to the passage of the Act, the
district court granted judgment on the pleadings on those claims to both defendants.
However, because Mrs. Cipollone began smoking a Liggett brand in 1942, the claims
against Liggett were not preempted, and a jury could consider only whether the pre-1966
tortious activity of Liggett was a proximate cause of Mrs. Cipollone's death. 649 F. Supp.
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The federal and state courts that subsequently entertained
cigarette cases generally echoed the determination of the Third
Circuit in Cipollone and barred causes of action based on cigarette warning labels or cigarette advertising.0 By the beginning

at 669, 673-75.
In another ruling, the district court struck the plaintiffs' "risk utility" claim on the
ground that it was barred due to the retroactive application of a New Jersey state statute. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 83-2864 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 1987), reconsideration
denied, (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 1987).
In yet another ruling, the district court struck the plaintiffs' "design defect" claim
on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that the defendants'
failure to market an alternatively designed cigarette when it was feasible in the mid1970s was a proximate cause of Mrs. Cipollone's death. 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1493-95
(D.N.J. 1988).
The Third Circuit, in an appeal from final judgment, affirmed the district court's
rulings dismissing the plaintiffs' post-1965 failure to warn, express warranty and intentional tort claims against all defendants but reversed the district court's ruling barring
the plaintiffs' "risk utility" claims. 893 F.2d 541, 547-48 (3d Cir. 1990).
Thus, after seven years of litigation, the plaintiffs have only a few remaining live
claims: a "risk utility" claim against all three defendants, a "conspiracy to defraud"
claim against all three defendants limited to their pre-1966 activity, a "fraudulent misrepresentation" claim against all three defendants limited to their pre-1966 activity, an
"express warranty" claim against Liggett based only on its pre-1966 activity, and a "failure to warn" claim against Liggett based only on its pre-1966 activity. While the pre1966 claims are viable, they suffer from a serious flaw: plaintiffs will have the unenviable
task of proving that the defendants' pre-1966 activity was the proximate cause of NM.
Cipollone's death in 1983.
However, the Supreme Court will have the last word on the plaintiffs' causes of
action. On December 28, 1990, the plaintiffs' attorneys filed for certiorari, seeking Supreme Court review of the Third Circuit's holding that the plaintiffs' post-1965 "failure
to warn" and "intentional misrepresentation" claims are preempted by the Act. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 25, 1991. 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
9 All subsequent circuit court decisions agreed with the Third Circuit's preemption
holding in Cipollone. See Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1989);
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1989); Palmer v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312
(11th Cir. 1987). In the state arena, the reasoning of the Third Circuit was followed by
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655
(Minn. 1989).
Of the six courts that have ruled against preemption in the cigarette cases prior to
the Dewey decision, three have been reversed on appeal Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
633 F. Supp 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), reu'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Cipolone, 593 F.
Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691 (1988), reu'd, 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989). Galbraith v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 144417 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 1985), appeal abandoned, (Cal. App. Mar. 31, 1986) and Haight v. American Tobacco Co., No. 84-2232
(S.D.W. Va. Dec. 26, 1984) were both decided before the Third Circuit opinion in Cipollone. In Montana v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 79850 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 1987),
vacating No. 79850 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 9, 1986), the court initially ruled against preemp-
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of 1990 there was a consensus among five circuit courts and the
highest court of Minnesota, that the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act (the Act), 10 enacted in 1965 to ensure uniform warning labels on cigarette packages, preempts all causes
of action based on the failure to warn consumers adequately after 1965 about the dangers of smoking. The failure to warn
claim, widely regarded as the most promising, had found its way
into the dustbin.1 1 To add to cigarette plaintiffs' woes, several
state legislatures have enacted statutes limiting a manufacturer's
liability for products that have inherently dangerous qualities
known to the consuming public.12 Together, these judicial and
legislative developments threatened to reduce this second wave
of tobacco liability suits to a barely perceptible ripple.
Against this background the New Jersey Supreme Court
reached a strikingly different conclusion in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.' s In Dewey, the court held that common law
tort claims based on cigarette manufacturers' failure to warn adequately of the dangers of smoking are not preempted by the
Act.1 4 While the Dewey court was not the first to hold that the
tion but vacated its opinion when the First Circuit opinion in Palmer was handed down.
10 Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341
(1988)). See notes 22-32 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the language
and history of the Act.
12 See Stein, CigaretteProducts Liability Law in Transition,54 TENN. L. REV. 631,
662 (1987) (failure to warn claim is the most promising claim in the cigarette liability
cases because failure to warn of the dangers inherent in a product deprives a consumer
not only of his ability to make an informed choice, a goal in contractual law, but also
misrepresents the nature of the product, a tort); Henderson, JudicialReview of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLuM. L. REV.
1531, 1565 n.143 (1973) (noting that the majority of design defect cases have been de.
cided on a failure to warn theory).
A duty to warn arises where there is information upon which a reasonable inference
might be drawn that there is a likelihood the product is potentially hazardous. Wade, On
the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge UnavailablePriorto Marketing, 58 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 734 (1983). In addition, warnings must be understandable and must accurately
convey the gravity of the possible harm. Warnings may otherwise be deemed inadequate
if promotion of the product neutralizes the warnings. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Policy and Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 SYRAcus.
L. REV. 897, 907 (1988).
12 California, Kansas, Louisiana, New Jersey, Ohio and Tennessee have enacted
such statutes. See notes 259-61 and accompanying text infra.
" 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990).
14 Id. This Comment will not address the second part of the opinion, in which the
Dewey court held that the New Jersey Products Liability Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C3a(2) (West 1987), did not apply retroactively to bar plaintiffs' "risk utility" claim. This
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Act did not preempt failure to warn claims,1 5 the decision is
nonetheless remarkable for its stance against the holdings of five
circuit courts, including the Third Circuit, which encompasses
New Jersey.16
This Comment first gives an overview of the history of the
Act and the federal government's involvement in the smoking
and health area. This Comment then discusses how the preemption issue has been resolved in prior tobacco litigation, from the
New Jersey district court opinion in Cipollone to the various cir-

cuit court opinions. Next, this Comment analyzes the Dewey decision, arguing that the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding on
the preemption issue was doctrinally correct. The Dewey court
effectively attacked the circuit courts' unrestrained application
of existing preemption doctrine to plaintiffs' claims. This Comment then focuses on preemption doctrine itself and takes to
task one of the traditional formulas used to determine whether
state law has been preempted by federal law. Under this
formula, first articulated by the Supreme Court in Hines v. Da-

vidowitz, courts will find state law preempted by federal law

ruling is in accord with the Third Circuit's ruling in Cipollone, 893 F.2d 541, 577-78 (3d
Cir. 1990).
,5 See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984) (the district court was the first
federal court to rule that the Act did not preempt any of plaintiffs' claims), rev'd, 789
F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
18 See Daynard, Up from the Ashes: CigaretteLitigation and the 'Dewey' Decision,
18 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 1078, 1079 (1990) (comparing the Dewey decision to
the arrival of cavalry in the final minutes of a Western); Hevesi, Court in New Jersey
Upholds Right to Sue CigaretteMakers, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1990, at Al, col 1 (noting
that the decision might lead to a review of the tobacco liability preemption issue by the
United States Supreme Court and reporting that the tobacco stocks fell sharply upon
news of the ruling); Deveny & Freedman, Tobacco Warnings Don't Pre-Empt Claims,
Court Rules, Wall St. J., July 27, 1990, at B1, coL 3 (remarking that this is the first time
a state's highest court has held that cigarette failure to wam claims are not preempted
and noting that attorneys affiliated with the tobacco industry described the case as
"aberrant").
Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court has been labeled "independent" in the past.
In a prescient New York Times article published two weeks before the Dewey decision,
Laurence Tribe, the Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard University,
praised the New Jersey Supreme Court as a forerunner in advancing the principles of
federalism, an issue central to the Dewey decision. Sullivan, New Jersey Court Seen As
Leader On Rights, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1990, at B1, col 2.
Moreover, the Dewey decision has recently gained adherence in a second appellate
court. In Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., a Texas court of appeals, expre.sing its agreement with the Dewey court, held that the Act did not preempt plaintiffs' failure to warn
claims. 805 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
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when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."17
This Comment submits that the Hines test invites courts to construe broadly the preemptive reach of federal law, leaving state
common law, in particular, without adequate constitutional safeguards against federal encroachment. Accordingly, this Comment proposes that the Hines formula be abandoned when the
preemption of state common law is at issue. Finally, this Comment addresses several important considerations that underlie
the circuit court decisions, including the desire to stem a potentially unmanageable flood of cigarette claims, but reiterates that
such practical concerns do not justify preemption of these state
law claims. Congress and the states have adequate means at
their disposal to put a stop to cigarette litigation, means that do
not involve expanding the scope of federal preemption to the
detriment of state common law.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The FederalGovernment's Relationship with Smoking and
Health

Although privately conducted studies demonstrating the
possible connection of smoking with various health hazards were
reported with increasing frequency after World War II, the first
widely publicized involvement of the federal government in the
smoking and health area came in 1964.18 In that year, the United
States Surgeon General issued a 387-page report entitled Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory Committee to the Sur312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
" The first large-scale epidemiological studies of the relationship between tobacco
17

and cancer began in the 1940s. US. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, SMOKING
AND HEALTH-A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 1-5 (1979).
Throughout the 1950s, certain magazines, READER'S DIGEST in particular, reported

on the growing body of medical evidence that revealed a link between smoking and cancer, chronic bronchitis and other diseases. M. NEUBERGER, SMOKE SCREEN: TOBACCO AND
THE PUBLIC WELFARE 80 (1963).
As early as 1957, the Surgeon General of the United States noted that "the weight of
the evidence is increasingly pointing in one direction: that excessive smoking is one of
the causative factors in lung cancer." 29 Fed. Reg. 8328 (1964). But the notoriety of the
Surgeon General's Report in 1964 surpassed any previous federal involvement in the
smoking and health area. See Crist & Majoras, supra note 2, at 557 (noting that media
attention has continued unabated since the release of the 1964 Surgeon General's
Report).
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geon General, which linked cigarette smoking to lung cancer,

bronchitis and emphysema. 19 The Surgeon General determined
importhat cigarette smoking was a "health hazard of 2sufficient
0
tance" to warrant remedial action by Congress.

Several state legislatures reacted immediately to the Advisory Committee report by establishing mandatory warning labels

for cigarettes sold within the state.2 1 Congress, in turn, responded both to the potential maze of inconsistent state regulations and to the Surgeon General's admonition that the federal

government take an active role in the smoking and health area
by enacting the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
in 1965.22 The Act's most apparent accomplishment was to establish a uniform system of federally mandated warning labels
on cigarette packages reading: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May

19 US. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,SMOKING AND HEALTH REPORT OP

THE ADVISORY CoMMIrrrEE To THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PuBLc HEALTH SERvicE 31

(1964) [hereinafter 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT].
20 Id. at 33.
21 For example, the New York State Legislature adopted the following label in June
1965: "WARNING: Excessive Use Is Dangerous to Health." Ch. 470, 1965 N.Y. Laws 663
(repealed).
See discussion in 111 CONG. REC. 13,901 (June 16, 1965) (statement of Sen. Moss):
Mr. President, many States are showing their concerns over the smoking and
health isue [sic]. For example, my own State [Utah] has recently considered
adopting labeling requirements, and the State of New York is also contemplating both labeling and advertising restrictions. While I do not favor individual
State action in this matter because of the maze of conflicting regulations which
would result, I feel that the States should be allowed to exercise this prerogative if the Federal Government does not choose to do so.
See also H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Seas. 3 (1965), reprinted in 1965 Us.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 2350, 2352.

I Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988)). The Act took effect on
January 1, 1966. The Act's declaration of policy and purpose is set forth in § 1331:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish a
comprehensive Federal program to deal with the cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may
be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to the effect on each
package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the
maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking
and health.
Id. § 1331.
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However, it must be empha-

sized that the passage of the Act was not without controversy, as
representatives from tobacco producing states insisted that their
tobacco constituents not be hampered in marketing their prod-

ucts. 2 4 Thus the final version of the Act is a compromise, as at-

tested to by the accompanying statement of congressional purpose, which declares that the Act has the dual purpose of
adequately informing the public of the hazards of smoking while
protecting cigarette commerce to the maximum extent.2 5
Congress's subsequent activity in the smoking and health
area has been considerable. 2 The Act was amended in 1970 to
implement a stronger warning label on cigarette packages:
"Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Smoking
Is Dangerous to Your Health. ' 27 The 1970 Act also prohibited
all cigarette advertising via the electronic media. 28 Additionally,

Congress gave express authority in the 1970 Act to administrative agencies to monitor smoking developments, to the Secretary
of Health and Human Services to monitor and annually report
on the health consequences of smoking, and to the Federal
Trade Commission to monitor the effectiveness of labeling and
advertising policies and issue an annual report on those policies.2 9 Finally, in 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive
Smoking Education Act, which implemented a system of rotating warnings to address the hazards of smoking more specifically 0 and established the Interagency Committee on Smoking
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988)).
24 See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 622-23 (lst Cir. 1983); Cipollone,
593 F. Supp. at 1157-1166 (for a discussion of the legislative history of the Act). See also
23

H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONO. &

N.ws 2350.
See notes 21-23, supra. See also Palmer, 825 F.2d at 623 (noting that "Congress
negotiated a hard-fought compromise" in passing the Act).
11 See Crist & Majoras, supra note 2, at 563-66. These commentators go so far as to
state that the evidence of past congressional involvement in the area of cigarette labeling
and marketing suggests that Congress has occupied the field.
" Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84
Stat. 88 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988)).
28 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988) (entitled "Unlawful Advertisements on Medium of Electronic Communication").
29 Id. § 1337 (entitled "Reports to Congress").
20 Comprehensive Smoking Education Act § 4, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200
(1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988)). These new warnings, which are
to be rotated quarterly, are:
ADMIN.
23
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and Health to disseminate information regarding smoking and
its adverse effects and to make appropriate recommendations to
Congress.31 Moreover, since 1964, the United States Surgeon
General has periodically issued reports reviewing the effects of
cigarette smoking on public health. 2
B. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: The District Court
Decision
Although there were numerous tobacco liability suits filed in
the 1950s and 1960s, the number dropped precipitously after the
passage of the Act.3 3 However, with the expansion of strict liabilSURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart
Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly
Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide.
15 U.S.C. § f333 (1988).
In addition, the 1984 amendments required that the warnings appear on all advertisements and outdoor billboards as well as on the cigarette package itself. Id.
31 Id. § 1341(a)-(c).
I See Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1027 n.42 (giving an exhaustive list of the Surgeon
General's Reports since 1964). See also Hilts, U.S. Cites List of Gains From Quitting
Smoking, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1990, at B4, col 4 (reporting that the Surgeon General
has issued 21 reports on the relation between smoking and health).
See Note, Plaintiffs' Conduct as a Defense to Claims Against CigaretteManufacturers, 99 HARv. L REv. 809 (1986) (noting that most cases in the cigarette product
liability area were brought in the late 19503 and early 19603).
There were a substantial number of cigarette cases brought before the passage of the
Act, all of which were unsuccessful See, e.g., Ross v. Philip Morris, Inc., 328 F.2d 3 (8th
Cir. 1964) (breach of implied warranty of fitness); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963) (breach of implied warranty
of fitness and negligence); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir.
1963) (product liability); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1962),
question certified to state court, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fi.), reu'd and remanded,325 F.2d 673
(5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964), reuld and remanded on rehearing,391
F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969)(en banc), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970) (breach of implied warranty of fitness for use); Pritchard v.
Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), affd on rehearing,350 F.2d
479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967) (warranty of fitness for use and negligent failure
to warn); Albright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1972), afTld,
485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974) (product liability); Fine v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (breach of warranty, negligence
and misrepresentation); Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F. Supp. 406 (LD. Pa.
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ity in the late 1970s and 1980s," ' tobacco suits returned to the
forefront of product liability litigation, beginning with Cipollone
v. Liggett Group Inc.5 In 1983 Antonio and Rose Cipollone
1960) (failure to warn and negligence); Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F.
Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1957), afl'd, 256 F.2d 464 (lst Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875
(1958) (fraud by false advertising).
For a thorough analysis of the early cigarette liability cases see Stein, supra note 11,
at 631-38; Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1030-36; Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil
Liability: A Modest Proposal,53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1423, 1423-28 (1980).
The first wave of tobacco suits effectively ended in 1970, when the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Green v. American Tobacco, 397 U.S. 911 (1970). Garner, supra, at
1423.
The theories advanced to explain the dropoff in such suits include: 1) the growing
body of lost lawsuits against the cigarette manufacturers, 2) the prohibitive cost of such
suits, 3) the effect of comment i of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, and 4)
the passage of the Act. See Levin, The Liability of Tobacco Companies-Should Their
Ashes Be Kicked, 29 ARIZ. L. Rav. 195, 200 (1987) (none of the early suits were successful
in obtaining damage awards); Edell, supra note 2, at 91 (the tortuous road of appeals
and retrials in many of these cases placed heavy financial burdens on plaintiffs' counsel,
resulting in many voluntary dismissals).
While the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A signaled the advent of strict
liability, it also put a halt to cigarette product liability litigation. Stein, supra note 11, at
639-47 (comment i of § 402A and the passage of the Act effectively immunized the tobacco industry). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs§ 402A provides, in part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977).

Id.

Comment i to § 402A, which defines "unreasonably dangerous," provides in part:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics ....
Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking
may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous.

34 See generally Schwartz, New Products, Old Products,Evolving Law, Retroactive
Law, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 796, 797-811 (1983) (discussing developments in products liability
theories).
" 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1043 (1987), on remand, 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986), later proceeding, 683
F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111
S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
See Note, The Effect of Cipollone:Has the Tobacco Industry Lost Its Impenetrable
Shield?, 22 GA. L. REv. 763, 770 n.47 (1989) (noting that the number of cases filed against
tobacco manufacturers has risen since the Cipollone case was filed in 1983).
The "new" wave of lawsuits has been linked to four developments: 1) the substantial
change in products liability law favoring plaintiffs, 2) growing scientific evidence that
smoking causes an array of diseases, 3) increasing public hostility towards smoking, and
4) increased cooperation among plaintiffs' attorneys. Jacobson, supra note 1, at 1036.
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brought a 14-count diversity suit in New Jersey district court
against Liggett Group, Inc., Philip Morris, Inc. and Loews Theatres, Inc. claiming that these defendants were liable in tort as
manufacturers of cigarettes that allegedly caused Mrs. Cipollone

to develop lung cancer." The defendants, in turn, asserted that
the plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the Act.3 7
In the decision that was to become a template for other
courts ruling in favor of cigarette plaintiffs, Judge Lee Sarokin
held that post-1965 failure to warn and intentional misrepresentation claims were not preempted by the Act.3 8 The court first
set out a brief history of preemption and categorized the present
forms of preemption. 9 The doctrine of preemption has its roots
in the Supremacy Clause,40 the court continued, which states

that the Constitution and federal laws passed pursuant to the
Constitution are paramount and that all states shall be bound
by such law.4 1
Judge Sarokin went on to explain that courts have had perennial difficulty determining when federal law preempts state
42
action, but that several basic principles of preemption do exist.

First, federal law may expressly preempt state law by incorporating an express preemption clause.4 Second, a federal law may

" Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1149. See notes 4-8 supra for an in-depth discussion of
the separate claims.
37

Id.

I Id. at 1170-71. In Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., the district judge expressed his
agreement with the "exhaustive and scholarly" opinion by Judge Sarokin. 633 F. Supp.
1171, 1173 (D.Mass. 1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987). The Minnesota Court of
Appeals echoed those sentiments in Forsterv. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., stating, "[wle
wish to acknowledge our reliance on the scholarly opinion of Judge Sarokin .... " 423
N.W.2d 691, 693 n.3 (1988), rev'd, 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989).
Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1150.
4 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cL 2. provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
41 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Justice John Marshall was an
early articulator of the doctrine of preemption. He noted in Gibbons that all state law
that was "repugnant" to an act of Congress would be deemed void. Id. at 37-38.
42

Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1150.

4' Id. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (state labeling requirement on packaged bacon held expressly preempted by congressional provision prohibiting implementation of "labeling, packaging or ingredient requirements in addition to, or
different than, those made under [federal statutes]"). Id. at 530.
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by implication preempt state law if Congress evinces an intent
to "occupy the field" of a certain subject matter." Third, federal
law may preempt state law to the extent that state law "actually
conflicts" with federal law. 4 5 Actual conflict occurs when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility' 4 or when state law stands as an "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.' 4 7 All of these doctrines of preemption, however,
are tempered by the presumption "that Congress did not intend
to displace State law."'' 4 Furthermore, this presumption is
strengthened when preemption would leave a plaintiff without
an adequate alternative remedy.49
Judge Sarokin first addressed the issue of express preemption. Defendants had argued that the preemption clause in the
Act, section 1334(b), expressly bars any "requirement or prohibition. . . under State law" based on the adequacy of cigarette
labeling and advertising, including state common law claims.5 0

11Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1150; Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Do La
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (legislative history of the Home Owners Act of 1933 made it
clear that Congress intended to establish a comprehensive national regulatory scheme
governing federal savings and loans and as such, the act preempted state laws, prohibiting certain banking techniques); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)
(through the United States Warehouse Act, Congress intended to occupy the field of
warehouse regulation, preempting state regulation).
" Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1151.
46 Florida Line & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (California law that regulated marketing of avocados upheld on grounds that it was not physi
cally impossible for a grower to comply with both federal and state laws regulating the
marketability of avocados).
47 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (Pennsylvania alien registration law
preempted because it conflicted with the comprehensive scheme for the regulation of
aliens established by the Federal Alien Registration Act).
48 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
" Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1153 ("The presumption against preemption in these
causes of action is strengthened when preemption would leave a putative plaintiff with.
out adequate remedy for violation of his or her state created rights."); Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984) ("This silence [with regard to state remedies]
takes on added significance in light of Congress' failure to provide any federal remedy for
persons injured by such conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without
comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.").
50 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988) (the preemption provision of the Act). Therein Congress
stated:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement
required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette
package.
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The court dissected the preemption clause, first noting that the
Act on its face expressly preempts all state legislation concerning cigarette labeling and advertising."' Next the court found
that, as a matter of legal definition, a state law tort action is not2
the equivalent of "a regulation or prohibition" under state law.

Defendants had further argued that the impact of a successful
state tort claim based on failure to warn adequately amounted
to regulation and thus should be preempted. To this the court
responded that the imposition of liability in a state tort action
against the tobacco companies would not be akin to regulation
because such a ruling would not act as an injunction requiring
the defendants to introduce new warning labels but would
merely present manufacturers with the choice of whether or not
to change their labels."
The court next addressed the issue of implied preemption,
breaking down its analysis into three parts.0 5 First the court conducted a lengthy examination of the legislative history of the
Act, focusing on whether Congress intended to preempt common
law actions.56 Finding no such intent manifest in the legislative
history, the court addressed the issue of whether Congress intended to preempt state common law claims by "occupying the
field" of cigarette labeling and advertising and again discovered
no such congressional intent.57 Ultimately, the court examined
whether allowing state tort law claims "actually conflicts" with
the Act.58
Judge Sarokin's opinion is probably most noteworthy for its
examination of the legislative history of the Act, an effort not
matched by any of the courts that have subsequently addressed
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of
this chapter.
Id.

51 Cipollone, 593
512Id. at 1155.

F. Supp. at 1154.

Id. at 1154-56.
" Id. at 1155-57. See also Garner, supra note 33, at 1454 (stating that a damage
award does not act like an injunction, requiring a cigarette company to affix new labels,
but merely acts as an incentive to do so).
Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1157-63.
"Id.
Id. at 1163-66.
Id. at 1166-70.
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the issue of cigarette claim preemption.5 9 The opinion reveals

that the bulk of the evidence from the congressional debates and
related hearings supports the contention that Congress did not
intend to preempt state common law. Among other telling indications, the opinion notes, there was significant discussion surrounding the effect the Act would have on the assumption of
risk defense, debate that would have been superfluous had Congress intended to preempt state claims.6 0 There were several
comments made by members of Congress directly indicating
that state common law claims should remain unaffected and almost no statements to the contrary."' Also, the court made the
point that the Act was passed while several large tobacco liability suits were pending in the federal appeals courts. 2 That no
mention of preemption of state tort claims surfaced in such a
context certainly suggests the continuing viability of such
actions.
Judge Sarokin then went on to examine whether Congress
intended to "occupy the field" of cigarette labeling and advertis59 Id. at 1157-63. The Third Circuit did not conduct a review of the legislative history, finding "the language of the statute itself a sufficiently clear expression of Congressional intent ..
" Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 186. The First Circuit refused to "wade into
the bog of doublespeaking legislative history ... " Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825
F.2d 620, 625 (1st Cir. 1987).
00 Id. at 1162. Congressman Fascell of Florida, commented that a manufacturer's
compliance with the Act "in no way affects the right to raise the defense of 'assumption
or [sic] risk.'" 111 CONG. REC. 16543-44 (July 13, 1965).
6 Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1163. Representative Watson stated that, "nowhere in
the Act of 1965 does it preclude an individual ... from pursuing a common law liability." Cigarette Labeling and Advertising: Hearings on H.R. 643, 1237, 3055 and 6543
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 579
(1969).
Even tobacco representatives present at the hearings did not spell out a desire that
the Act preempt state law claims. See Hearings on S. 559 and S. 547 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 246, 548 (1965) (statements of Bowman
Gray, Chairman of the Board of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.).
£2 Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1161-62. Two notable cases were Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), question certified to state court, 154 So. 2d 169
(Fla.), rev'd and remanded, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943
(1964), rev'd and remanded on rehearing,391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd per curiam,
409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970) (implied warranty of fitness for use); Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d
Cir. 1961), aff'd on rehearing, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987
(1966), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967) (warranty
of fitness for use and negligent failure to warn).
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ing to the exclusion of state law claims.6 The court noted that
there are three ways by which Congress may occupy the field in
a given area: if federal regulation of that area is pervasive, if the
federal interest in the area is dominant, or if Congress makes
clear its intention to occupy that area." The caveat is that occupation of the field will "not be lightly inferred."6" Judge Sarokin
noted that the Act set up a narrow area of congressional involvement, limited to the promulgation of a warning label, the establishment of cigarette advertising restrictions and the monitoring
of developments on smoking and health."6 The decision asserted
that products liability matters and compensation to injured
plaintiffs are not a part of the Act's scheme and are accordingly
left to the states. 7 Furthermore, regulation of the smoking and
health area has been considerably less pervasive than in areas
such as labor or nuclear power, and even there courts have been
hesitant to set aside state law."8 The court also pointed out that
Congress does not have a traditional interest in state tort remedies and thus cannot be said to have a dominant interest in the
field.6 9
Finally the court addressed whether state tort law actually
conflicts with the Act. Conflicts occur either where compliance
with both state and federal law is a "physical impossibility" or
where compliance with state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. ' 70 This second prong of the actual conflict test
has come to be known as the Hines "obstacle conflict" test. Once
more the presumption against preemption enters into the calcu-

" Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1163-66.

" Id. See note 44 supra, noting Supreme Court cases that address "occupation of
field" preemption.
Co.NsTrrmo.N
65 Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1164. See also L. T=Bna AcuANr
LAW 377 (1978).
Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1164.
67 Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1164-65. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 250 (1984) (al-

though the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act evidenced a Congressional intent
to occupy the field of nuclear safety, it did not preempt tort remedies); New York Dep't
of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973) (holding that the "apparent comprehensiveness" of the WIN provisions of the Social Security Act was not sufficient to support the preemption of New York Work Rules).
"' Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1153, 1166. Torts are traditionally governed by state
law.

70 Id. at 1166. See notes 217-18 infra.
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lation, and the court again cautioned that actual conflict "ought
not be lightly inferred.

' 71

The physical impossibility rationale

for preemption was quickly dismissed: Liggett could comply
with both federal and state law by continuing to use the federally mandated warning label and simultaneously pay damages to
successful tort plaintiffs.7 2 For the second part of the actual conflict analysis, using the Hines test, the court posited a tripartite
congressional purpose behind the Act: 1) to allow the cigarette
industry to survive, 2) to protect cigarette manufacturers by enacting uniform labeling and advertising requirements, and 3) to
warn the public adequately of the health concerns of smoking.7 3
The court reasoned that allowing these suits would not jeopardize the tobacco industry, especially considering the failure of
such suits in the past. 4 As to the tension between the uniform
labeling requirements and the possibility of state tort liability,
the court gave a brief argument that such claims can be tolerated.7 First, Judge Sarokin noted that there are many other areas governed by federal labeling laws where courts have retained
strict tort liability. 76 Second, the court held that as a general

rule compensation, which is the primary goal of such common
law claims, does not interfere with the governmental regulation
of products.7 7 Finally, the court dismissed as hypothetical the
Id.
Id. at 1167.
73 Id. at 1168-69.
7 Id. at 1168 n.17. As of March 1991 cigarette manufacturers have never had a damage award sustained against them in a cigarette product liability suit. The Cipollone case
resulted in the only jury verdict requiring a cigarette manufacturer to pay damages, and
it was reversed on appeal. Marcus & Lambert, Tobacco Liability Case Nears High
Court, Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1991, at B6, col. 4.
71 Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1168. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
256 (1984) (the Court admitted that there was a "tension" created by allowing state tort
liability and federal regulation of nuclear safety under the AEA but held that it was a
tension Congress was apparently willing to accept).
71 Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1169. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
642 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1981) (FDA-approved warning did not preempt state product
liability claim against drug manufacturers despite the preemptive effect generally accorded to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938)); Raymond
v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1026-28 (1st Cir. 1973) (state products liability
law applied despite warnings established by the Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1191 (1953)); Hubbard Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir. 1965)
(state tort action for failure to warn not preempted despite label approval from Depart.
ment of Agriculture).
7 Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1169. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 263-66 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (holding that compensatory damages unlike punitive damages would not in71
72
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defendants' argument that tort liability will subject manufacturers to multiple and conflicting standards with regard to labeling
and advertising, thereby undermining the goal of the Act. It is
entirely possible that plaintiffs will not prevail in these lawsuits
and even if they do, manufacturers can choose to pay tort
awards rather than change labeling or advertising practices.78
C.

Subsequent Court Decisions

The district court's preemption analysis in Cipollone did
not find many adherents among courts that subsequently ruled
in tobacco cases. While the defendants' appeal to the Third Circuit in Cipollone was pending, a district court in Tennessee became the first to hold that failure to warn claims were preempted by the Act.79 In Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
the court gave short shrift to the plaintiffs' failure to warn claim,
not even mentioning Cipollone in its discussion. While the opinion agreed with the district court in Cipollone that the preemption clause of the Act did not explicitly prohibit state common
law actions, the Roysdon court determined that permitting a
damage award based on inadequate warning labels would be incompatible with the intent of Congress."
The Third Circuit, reversing the Cipollone district court,
also refused to adopt Judge Sarokin's reasoning.8 ' While the circuit court agreed that state tort claims were not expressly preempted, the panel determined that such claims were by implication preempted. 2 First the court noted that there was no need
to resort to the Act's legislative history in light of the sufficiently
clear language of the statute.8 3 The court then engaged in a hy-

brid "occupy the field"/"actual conflict analysis," initially asserting that Congress established a comprehensive federal program
terfere with federal regulation of nuclear safety).
18 Cippolone, 593 F.Supp. at 1169.

7 Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985),
aff'd, 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988).
11 Id. at 1191. More specifically, the Roysdon court held that allowing such claims
would undermine Congress's intent to enact uniform labeling and advertising requirements, "permitting a state to achieve indirectly, through exposure to tort liability, what
it could not achieve directly through legislation." Id.
8' Cipollone, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
82
3

Id. at 185-87.
Id. at 186.
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which evidenced its intent to "occupy a field." 4 To determine
the scope of that field, the court examined the extent to which
the plaintiffs' claims "actually conflict[ed]" with the Act to ascertain which claims were preempted.8 5 The court next stated
that the Act represented a "carefully drawn balance" between
the goal of adequately warning of the dangers of smoking and
the goal of protecting the interests of the tobacco industry.8 0
Finding that state law claims based on warning labels or advertising would have a regulatory effect and would frustrate the
objectives of Congress if successful, the court held that these
claims "actually conflict" with the Act.8 7 The court of appeals
accordingly reversed the district court and granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on preemption
grounds. 8
The other circuit courts fell into line with the Third Circuit's decision in Cipollone, all agreeing that while state tort actions based on cigarette warning labels or advertising were not
expressly preempted, they were by implication preempted. The
84 Id. (quoting Cipollone, 593 F.Supp. at 1164 (emphasis in original)).
85 Id. at 187. To evaluate the degree of this conflict, the Third Circuit examined
"first the purposes of the federal law and second the effect of the operation of the state
law on these purposes." Id. (citing Fineberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 63 (3d Cir. 1980)).
" Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
87 Id. For support the Third Circuit cited three cases in which state common law
actions were preempted by federal law: Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 156-59 (1982); Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile
Co., 450 U.S. 311, 324-25 (1981); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 247 (1959).
But see Edell & Walters, The Doctrine of Implied Preemption in Products Liability
Cases-Federalismin the Balance, 54 TENN. L. REV. 603, 607, 621-22 (1987). These authors note that the three cases cited above are readily distinguished from the cigarette
cases in that the federal law in question in these cases established federal remedial
mechanisms or because the area in question was traditionally occupied by the federal
government. In Fidelity, regulations promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Board pursuant to the Home Owners Act of 1933 were aimed at federal savings and loans and
preempted state common law doctrines prohibiting certain banking practices because
Congress intended to "occupy the field." 458 U.S. at 159-67.
In Kalo Brick, the Court held that the Interstate Commerce Act barred a shipper
from pursuing a state law action for damages against a regulated carrier because the Act
itself created a well-defined federal remedy in place of a state law remedy. 450 U.S. at
321-22.
In Garmon, the Court held that the National Labor Relations Act preempted a state
law action for business losses caused by union picketing, partly because the Act itself
articulated federal remedial practices for unfair labor practices, partly because labor is a
traditional concern of the federal government. 359 U.S. at 242-45.
88 Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
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Eleventh Circuit in Stephen v. American Brands, Inc. adopted
the reasoning of the Third Circuit wholesale, without any elaboration.89 The First Circuit followed with Palmer v. Liggett
Group, Inc. in 1987.0 Rather than determining which category
of preemption the Act would fit into, the First Circuit examined
the effect the suit would have on the federal regulation Congress
established to balance the purposes of health warnings with the
purposes of protecting tobacco commerce.,, The effect, the First
Circuit continued, would be that one jury could conceivably disrupt the careful balance created by the Act-an intolerable result. 92 The court then advanced some additional arguments. It
compiled precedent showing that a federal court can cut off
state remedies without providing a substitute remedy. 3 The
court also held that a decision holding a manufacturer liable
would have the effect of regulation, and thus violate the Act's
preemption provision. A manufacturer who has a jury verdict
entered against it is faced with a Hobson's choice: implement
new warnings or be faced with large damage awards in the
4
9

future.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Roysdon v. R.J.

825 F.2d 312, 313 (11th Cir. 1987).
825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
Si Id. at 625-26. The court acknowledged that for state law to be preempted, the
effect of the state law on a federal scheme must be actual and not potential Id. at 626.
See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).
However, it is instructive to note that while the court sets up its task by talking of
the "actual" effect state tort law will have on the federal scheme, in its analysis it reverts
to discussing the potential and conceivable disrupting effect of tort claims. For instance,
the court notes "we do view compensatory damages as potentially regulatory in nature."
Palmer, 825 F.2d at 625 n.10 (emphasis added). In a more pregnant passage the court
notes "[i]t
is inconceivable that Congress intended to have that carefully wrought balance superseded by the views of a single state, perhaps by the views of a single jury in a
single state." Id. at 626 (emphasis added). Later on the court notes, "if a manufacturer's
warning that complies with the Act is inadequate under a state tort theory, the damages
awarded can be viewed as state regulation: the decision effectively compels the manufacturer to alter its warning." Id. (emphasis added). The court's qualified language reveals
an uncertainty as to the actual effect tort claims will have on the Act. Such speculation
does not support preemption.
92 Palmer, 825 F.2d at 625 n.10.
"Id. at 627. See Chicago North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450
U.S. 311 (1981); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina EnvtL Study Group, Inc. 438 US. 59 (1978);
Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1959). See note 206 infra for a full discussion of
these cases.
Palmer, 825 F.2d at 627. The court compared the choice of how to react to a
damage award to "the free choice of coming up for air after being underwater." Id.
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Reynolds Tobacco Co.95 and the Fifth Circuit in Pennington v.
Vistron Corp.9 6 echoed the Palmer court's reasoning, finding

that the inadequate warning claims would both conflict with
Congress's national label scheme and upset the balance established in the Act between adequately warning the public and
protecting the national economy. The Supreme Court of Minnesota rounded out the pro-preemption rulings in 1989 with Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 9 7 The preemption advocates
had seemingly won.98
II.

THE

Dewey

DECISION

On August 20, 1982, Claire Dewey, as executrix of her husband's estate, commenced a product liability action in New
Jersey Superior Court against three cigarette manufacturers:
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., American Brands, Inc., and Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp."" Her husband, Wilfred Dewey, began smoking in 1942 and continued to do so until his death from
lung cancer in November 1980.100 In her second amended complaint of June 28, 1983, Mrs. Dewey asserted that the defendants' cigarettes were defectively designed, that the defendants
failed to warn the public and/or the plaintiff adequately of the
hazards of smoking, and that the defendants committed fraud
95 849 F.2d 230, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1988).
96 876 F.2d 414, 421 (5th Cir. 1989). The Fifth Circuit was the first U.S. court of
appeals to decide which of the plaintiffs' tort claims were specifically preempted by the
Act. The court found that the failure to warn claim was preempted and the claim that
cigarettes are "unreasonably dangerous per se" (a risk utility, design defect theory) was
not preempted. Id. at 423.
97 437 N.W.2d 655, 660 (Minn. 1989). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs' cause of action for failure to warn was preempted but determined that plaintiffs' unsafe design claim and misrepresentation claim were not preempted. The court
also held that plaintiffs' breach of warranty claim was not preempted insofar as it was
not based on a duty to warn. Id.
" The only protest from the ranks of the circuit courts came from Chief Judge Gibbons in his concurring opinion in Cipollone, 893 F.2d 541, 583 (3d Cir. 1990). Judge
Gibbons believed that the Third Circuit's interlocutory ruling on the preemptive effect
of the Act was incorrect insofar as the panel reached a definitive ruling in the absence of
an adequate factual record. He hinted that the Supreme Court might reverse the Third
Circuit's preemption finding. Id.
"' Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 N.J. Super. 347, 349, 523 A.2d 712, 713
(1986), aff'd sub nom. Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 225 N.J. Super.
375, 542 A.2d 919 (App. Div. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990).
19 Dewey, 216 N.J. Super. at 350, 523 A.2d at 714.
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and misrepresentation in their advertising and marketing of
cigarettes. 10 1
The ensuing litigation, which eventually worked its way up
to the New Jersey Supreme Court, concerned a motion for summary judgment filed by only one of the defendants, Brown &
Williamson. The decedent, Wilfred Dewey, began smoking the
defendant's brand "Viceroy" in 1977, eleven years after the passage of the Act and the appearance of cigarette warning labels,
and three years before his death. 102 Brown & Williamson moved

for summary judgment on the ground that because the plaintiff
began smoking the defendant's products after the appearance of
federal warnings on cigarette packages, the Act preempted all of
the plaintiffs' claims. 103
A.

The New Jersey Superior Court

The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment in part, holding that the failure to warn claim and the
fraud and misrepresentation in advertising claim were preempted, while the defective design claim was not.2" The trial

judge found himself bound to follow the dictate of the Cipollone
circuit court that the preemption defense apply,106 and he proceeded to determine which of the claims would in fact be preempted, a task that the Cipollone circuit court had left to the
district court on remand." 6 Accordingly, the trial court found
actual conflict with the Act in the plaintiffs' claim that the defendant failed to warn the plaintiff's decedent adequately of the
hazards of smoking subsequent to the effective date of the
Act.. Similarly, the trial court found that the Act preempted
the plaintiffs' claim that predicated liability on fraud and misrepresentation in defendant's advertising and marketing of
101 Id.

Dewey, 121 N.J. 69, 73, 577 A.2d 1239, 1241.
Dewey, 216 N.J. Super. at 349, 523 A.2d at 713.
104 Id.
at 354-55, 523 A.2d at 716.
205 Id. at 353-54, 523 A.2d at 715. The trial court held that under New Jersey law,
102

federal decisional law is binding upon the state court when the state court must interpret
federal statutes. Since the Third Circuit was the only court of appeals to have ruled on
the preemptive effect of the Act in 1986, the trial court felt compelled to adopt Cipollone's reasoning. Cf. notes 109 and 115 infra.
106 Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 188.
Dewey, 216 N.J. Super. at 355, 523 A.2d at 715.
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cigarettes. 10 8

B. The New Jersey Appellate Division
The appellate division also concluded that the Act preempted the plaintiffs' failure to warn, fraud, and misrepresentation in advertising claims. 109 As a practical matter, the court
adopted the reasoning of the circuit courts; its preemption analysis was grounded on two lengthy quotes from the Palmer cir108

Id. at 355, 523 A.2d at 716.
However, the trial court did find the plaintiffs' design defect claim reconcilable with
the Act. Design defect claims, the trial court reasoned, do not directly implicate the way
in which a product is labeled or advertised, and thus do not come in conflict with the
Act, but rather aim at showing that a product is unreasonably dangerous despite warnings that a manufacturer might include on the package. The court added that, in New
Jersey, the maintenance of a design defect claim would allow the trier of fact to conduct
a risk-utility analysis. Dewey, 216 N.J. Super. at 355-57, 523 A.2d at 715-16.
The risk-utility test was adopted by New Jersey in Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g
Co., 76 N.J. 152, 174, 386 A.2d 816, 826 (1978). Because New Jersey adopted the riskutility test, a plaintiff does not need to prove the feasibility of a safer, alternative design
to support her design defect claim.
Under the risk-utility test, a plaintiff can make a prima facie showing that a product
is defective if the product's risk outweighs its utility. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973). The seven part risk-utility
test outlined in Wade's article was adopted by New Jersey in Cepeda. The test weighs
the following factors:
1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to
the public as a whole.
2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury,
and the probable seriousness of the injury.
3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need
and not be as unsafe.
4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its
utility.
5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and
their avoidability, because of the general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 174, 386 A.2d at 826.
'"9 Dewey, 225 N.J. Super. 375, 542 A.2d 919 (App. Div. 1988), rev'd, 121 N.J. 69,
577 A.2d 1239 (1990). The appellate court noted that while a state court should be deferential to a circuit court's decision on a federal statutory interpretation question, it is not
compelled to follow the federal court. See State v. Norfelt, 67 N.J. 268, 286, 337 A.2d
609, 617 (1975). Accordingly, the appellate division conducted an independent review of
the preemptive reach of the Act.
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cuit court decision, the thrust of which were that, if allowed to
go to trial, inadequate warning claims would excessively disrupt
the regulatory scheme enacted by Congress. 110 Accordingly, the
appellate division held that while inadequate warning claims
were not expressly preempted, such claims were in "actual conflict" with Congress's purpose of preventing non-uniform cigarette and labeling requirements and thus were by implication
preempted."'
C.

The New Jersey Supreme Court Decision

By the time Dewey reached the New Jersey Supreme
Court,"' five circuit courts and the Supreme Court of Minnesota
had upheld the preemption defense. 13 A victory for the defendants would undoubtedly have sounded the death knell for tobacco litigation in New Jersey." 4 But the Dewey court did not

oblige the cigarette manufacturers. Preferring the reasoning of
Judge Sarokin to that of the circuit courts, the court held that
the plaintiffs' inadequate warning and misrepresentation claims
were not preempted by the Act.
In essence, the Dewey court advanced a five-step analysis in
the cigarette liability preemption debate: first, there exists a
well-established heavy presumption against preemption of state
tort actions; second, as a matter of "actual conflict" preemption
analysis, state tort claims have only a tangential relationship to
the congressional purposes behind the Act; third, tort law has
important compensatory goals and, as a matter of public policy,
it is necessary that states retain the right to afford their injured
110 Dewey, 225 N.J. Super. at 380-81, 542 A.2d at 922 (quoting Palmer,825 F.2d at
626-28).
" Id. The appellate division also agreed with the trial court's determination that
the Act did not preempt plaintiffs' design defect claim. However, due to the enactment
of the New Jersey Products Liability Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A-58C-1 in 1987, the appellate division ruled that Mrs. Dewey could only proceed on a pared-down risk-utility theory. The appellate division held that a design defect claim premised on the theory that
the defendants could have implemented a safer, alternative design was the only claim
available to the plaintiff. 225 N.J. Super. at 382, 542 A.2d at 923.
112 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990).
113 See note 9 supra.
114 Had the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in favor of preemption, both the Third
Circuit, in which New Jersey sits, and the state's highest court would have been in agreement-formidable precedent in favor of tobacco companies defending suits in New
Jersey.
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citizens compensation; fourth, there are a number of analogous
federal labeling statutes that expressly preempt state regulation
of the federal labels but allow inadequate warning claims; and,
fifth, had Congress wanted to preempt state common law claims
in the Act, it would have done so expressly.
After giving a brief history of preemption, the Act, and the
circuit court decisions, 115 the Dewey court prefaced its argument
by emphasizing the strong presumption against federal preemption. The court compiled various United States Supreme Court
formulations of this presumption: the Court requires a showing
of a "clear and manifest purpose" on the part of Congress,110 or
an "unambiguous congressional mandate" to preempt state law
remedies. 1 7 Moreover, such a presumption is heightened when
state and local health and safety matters are at issue."18
Passing over the express preemption and "occupying the
field" preemption doctrines because of the general agreement
among the circuit courts that Congress neither expressly preempted state cigarette injury tort claims nor occupied the field
of tobacco regulation, the court directed its attention to the "actual conflict" brand of preemption. 1 9 In its actual conflict analysis, the court first considered the purpose of the federal law and
then evaluated the effect that the plaintiffs' tort claims would
have on the uniform labeling purpose of the Act.12 0 The court
118 The

threshold issue, whether the state court was compelled to follow the preemption rulings of the unanimous circuit courts was decided in the negative. Agreeing
with the appellate division, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that, according to New
Jersey law, the state courts are to give the circuit court opinions "due respect" but are
not bound by such decisions. State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 36, 214 A.2d 393, 403 (1965).
In Coleman, the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to follow the Third Circuit's constitutional analysis in United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (1965).
118 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[T]he historic police
powers of the states were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.").
.. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147 (1963) (California statute regulating avocado maturity did not come into conflict with a federal regulation that established different standards for avocado maturity--"[W]e are not to conclude that Congress legislated the ouster of this California statute by the marketing
orders in the absence of an unambiguous congressional mandate to that effect.").
118 Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 715 (1985) (local blood plasma donation ordinance was not preempted by FDA regulations governing the same activity, in large part because the ordinance addressed a
health matter of great concern to the locality).
11 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 82-84, 577 A.2d at 1246.
120 Id. at 87-88, 577 A.2d at 1248. See Palmer, 825 F.2d at 627.
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advanced a novel interpretation of the purpose behind the
Act. 21 The court held that Congress had a hierarchy of goals in
mind when it passed the Act. Warning the public of the hazards
of smoking was the first and paramount purpose of the Act. The
second stated purpose, that of protecting the interests of the national economy, was indeed a secondary goal in the court's view,
only to be accomplished if "consistent with" the primary goal of
adequately warning the public. 1 22 Here, the Dewey court directly
challenged the circuit courts' emphasis on the "carefully drawn
balance" between the two purposes of the Act. 23 The court suggested that Congress could accept an imbalance in favor of
warning the public, as long as the imbalance would not inordinately obstruct national economic interests.
The court then addressed the effect tort claims would have
on the Act. The court attacked as tenuous the precedent of San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 2' relied on by the circuit courts to show that state damage awards have a direct "regulatory" effect. 25 The court pointed out that several recent Su121 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 87-88, 577 A.2d at 1248.
12 Id. The court referred back to the Act's legislative

history to demonstrate that
the "principle purpose" of the Act was to "provide adequate warning to the public of the
potential hazards of cigarette smoking" through the labeling requirement. HA.REP. No.
449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in, 1965 US. CODE CoNG. & Aunm. NEws 2350.
12 This is one of the few instances where the Dewey court's conclusions are not
compelling. The language of the statute itself does not comport with the court's assertion
that the commerce protection goal was secondary. Rather, § 1331 plainly states that
commerce should be protected "to the maximum extent consistent with" warning the
public. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (emphasis added). Moreover, the history of the Act,
which reveals that its passage was the result of a hard-fought compromise between partisan forces, militates against the conclusion that the warning goal trump3 the commerce
protection goal. Dewey, 121 N.J. at 104, 577 A.2d at 1256-57 (Antell, J., dissenting);
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir. 1987). Admittedly conflicting,
these goals are also interdependent.
However, the Dewey court's questionable interpretation of the purposes behind the
Act does not seem to infect the rest of the court's reasoning. The court does not refer to
its interpretation of the purposes behind the Act in any other part of the opinion, and it
accords the commerce protection goal significant weight in determining whether to allow
the plaintiffs' failure to warn and intentional misrepresentation claims to stand as an
obstacle to the Act.
12, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Garmon, the Court addressed whether a lumber business
owner could bring an action for damages against a union for picketing in front of his
business. The Court held that the damage action was preempted because the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1935), vests all power
over peaceful union activity in the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
11" Dewey, 121 N.J. at 88, 577 A.2d at 1248 (citing Garmon, 359 US. at 246-47). The
Dewey court ably distinguishes Garman. First, the Garman ruling was peculiar to the
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preme Court decisions, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,120
Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller,12 7 and English v. General

Electric Co., 128 moved away from Garmon and rejected the preemption defense and the notion that allowing state tort claims is
akin to imposing state regulation. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court found that the state law claims involved did not
reach the level of direct legislative regulation. When confronted
with direct state regulation, manufacturers are forced to change
their behavior, often on penalty of criminal proceedings; when
confronted with a common law damage award, manufacturers
may choose how they will change their behavior or whether they
NLRB because there is a presumption in favor of preemption whenever the NLRB is
involved. Dewey, 121 N.J. at 88, 577 A.2d at 1248 (citing Brown v. Hotel Employees Int'l
Union, 468 U.S. 491, 501 (1984)). Second, the NLRA established its own remedial
scheme for unfair labor practices, unlike the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
which sets up no remedy for the victims of cigarette-related injuries. See Garner v.
Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953). Furthermore, the concurring judges in
Garmon viewed the majority opinion with a good deal of skepticism, noting that the
majority opinion might "cut deeply into the ability of the states to furnish an effective
remedy" for those injured by tortious conduct. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 253 (Harlan, Clark,
Whittaker, and Stewart, J.J., concurring). Subsequently, the Supreme Court has carved
out many exceptions to the NLRA's preemptive reach. See Farmer v. Bhd. of Carpenters
& Joiners of Am., Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (allowing state law trespass actions in a
labor-relations context). In Farmer,the Court stated that "inflexible application of the
[Garmon] doctrine is to be avoided, especially where the State has a substantial interest
in regulation of the conduct at issue and the State's interest is one that does not
threaten undue interference with the regulatory scheme." 430 U.S. at 302. See also Cipollone, 539 F. Supp. at 1153 n.3.
Finally, it should be noted that the Garmon opinion is full of language suggesting
that "threatened interference" or "potential frustration" with a congressional policy
would be sufficient to preempt state tort action. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243, 245. Such
potential conflict would not support a finding of preemption today. See Rice v. Norman
Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).
.26 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (state law action against a nuclear facility for radiation
injuries not preempted by the AEA). The court in Dewey cited Silkwood as evidence
that Congress is often willing to accept the incidental regulatory consequences state law
claims might have on a federal statute, even if direct state legislation is preempted.
Dewey, 121 N.J. at 88-89, 577 A.2d at 1248-49.
1-7 486 U.S. 174, 186 (1988) (injured workers' claim for supplemental benefits based
on state law was not preempted by the AEA). In Miller, the Supreme Court stated that,
"Congress may reasonably determine that incidental regulatory pressure is acceptable,
whereas direct regulatory authority is not." Id.
128 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990) (nuclear plant employee's state law claim for emotional
distress caused by defendant's alleged retaliatory firing of plaintiff for "whistleblowing"
was not preempted by the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) despite tangential effects
upon the ERA's purpose). The Court held that such state law claims did not reach the
level of direct legislative regulation and should be permitted because they do not come
into "actual conflict" with the federal law. Id. at 2278.
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will change it at all. The manufacturer could, for instance, place

a package insert in its product, a practice not regulated by the
Act, or might simply find it more cost effective not to change its
label and instead pay periodic damage awards.1 20
The court next advanced a policy argument against preemption, holding that state tort law may have "broader compensatory goals" than federal regulation. 1 0 A state has broad powers
to promote the health of its citizens and provide compensation
pven in the face of a federal warning scheme.1 31 The court indicated that it had chosen to focus on the compensatory goal of
tort law rather than on any incidental regulatory effect granting
1 32
such an award might have.
The court also noted that a number of other federal labeling
statutes and regulations expressly preempt state regulation of
products governed by federal law but allow for state law tort
claims based on inadequate warning. For instance, courts have
held that compliance with the Food and Drug Administration's
oral contraceptive labeling requirements,1 33 and the labeling requirements of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act 1 3 and the
1 do not imFederal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 33
I" Dewey, 121 N.J. at 90, 577 A.2d at 1249 (citing Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1154).
See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 264 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1I Dewey, 121 N.J. at 90, 577 A.2d at 1250 (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
736 F.2d 1529, 1540 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984)).
131 Id. In Ferebee, the court focused on the compensatory goal of allowing the plaintiff, whose husband died from dermal exposure to dangerous chemicals, to proceed with
her claim, despite the fact that the label on the chemical compound complied with the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982)
(FIFRA), and despite the possibility that allowing such a suit would conflict with
FIFRA's regulatory aim of uniform labeling.
131 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 91, 577 A.2d at 1250.
23 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 92, 577 A.2d at 1250-51 (citing MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131,475 N.E.2d 65 (1985)). Warnings on oral contraceptives are
to be "precise and nationally uniform." 21 C.F.R. § 310.501(a) (1984). In MacDonald,the
court held that compliance with FDA labels did not shield manufacturers from liability.
MacDonald, 394 Mass. at 139, 475 N.E.2d at 70.
"I Dewey, 121 N.J. at 93, 577 A.2d at 1251 (citing Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366
A.2d 1079 (D.C. 1976)). The Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA) sets up a labeling requirement for hazardous household substances sold in interstate commerce and,
like the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, specifically enjoins states from
establishing different labels. Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 17(a), 90 Stat. 510 (1976) (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1263 (1970)). However, in Burch, the court concluded that plaintiffs
may bring failure to warn claims despite a manufacturer's compliance with the FHSA.
366 A.2d at 1085.
1 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 92, 577 A.2d at 1250-51 (citing Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
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munize manufacturers of products regulated by these federal
laws from liability based on inadequate warning." 6 The court
likened these other federal labeling laws to the Act; whatever
tension there may be between preempting state regulations and
permitting state tort claims has been accepted by Congress in
various federal statutes and regulations which, like the Act,13are
7
aimed at establishing a nationally uniform labeling scheme.

736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984)). In Ferebee,the court held
that FIFRA did not preempt claims based on inadequate warning. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1982).
M The Dewey court was undoubtedly worried about the potentially catastrophic
consequences if the holdings of the circuit courts in the cigarette cases were to carry over
to the food and drug area. See Tribe, Federalism with Smoke and Mirrors,THE NATION,
June 7, 1986, at 788, 790 ("[The Third Circuit's] view of preemption has the burning
force of a prairie fire, and it is hard to see what structures of state compensation would
survive the ensuing conflagration. Food, drugs, cosmetics and toxic substances are all
governed by federal warning laws.").
13' The analogy between the Act and the other federal labeling laws, while instructive on the preemptive reach of the Act, is hardly dispositive. The regulatory schemes set
up by FIFRA, FHSA ahd the FDA regulation of oral contraceptives are distinguishable
from that established in the Act insofar as the goal of uniformity is more apparent in the
Act than in these other federal schemes. Under FIFRA, the EPA governs the warnings
on over 40,000 herbicides and pesticides. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 628 n.13. Moreover, the
EPA does not promulgate a precise warning for each herbicide and pesticide but, rather,
requires each manufacturer to submit a proposed label for approval. Id. Clearly, concerns with uniformity were not as overriding in FIFRA as in the Act and thus it appears
that inadequate warning claims would pose less of an obstacle to FIFRA's warning
scheme than to the Act's. With regard to the FDA warning labels on oral contraceptives,
the FDA does not promulgate official warnings but requires individual companies to prepare booklets informing the user of the hazards of their particular contraceptives. 21
C.F.R. § 310.501 (1978). Again the goal of uniformity was not as central to the FDA
scheme as it was to the Act. Finally, the FHSA was enacted to strengthen the warnings
on approximately 300,000 common household products, and Congress did not prescribe
specific warnings but gave only general instructions on the warnings. 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (p)
(1) (1970); Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1082, 1085 (D.C. 1976). Once
again, uniformity was not as central to the FHSA as to the Act.
Furthermore, there was really no question that state tort claims would survive the
FDA oral contraceptive labeling scheme and the FHSA. In MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., the court gave the defendant's preemption argument short shrift,
merely asserting that the regulatory history of the FDA's warning scheme revealed that
the FDA specifically intended to allow for state tort claims. 394 Mass. 131, 139, 475
N.E.2d 65, 70 (1985). In Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., the court did not even address the
preemptive reach of the FHSA, apparently assuming that state tort claims would survive
the enactment of the statute. 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. 1976). In essence, both MacDonald
and Burch merely held that compliance with a federal regulation or statute would not
immunize a manufacturer from liability for failure to warn adequately. MacDonald, 394
Mass. 131, 139, 475 N.E.2d 65, 70; Burch, 366 A.2d 1079, 1085.
Preemption, which is the sole issue in Dewey, is significantly different from the defense of compliance with a federal statute or regulation. In the compliance defense con-
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In its final note on preemption, the court stated: "We are

convinced that had Congress intended to immunize cigarette
manufacturers from packaging, labeling, misrepresentation, and
warning claims, it knew how to do so with unmistakable specificity."'' 38 Accordingly, the Dewey court held that the plaintiffs' inadequate warning and misrepresentation
preempted.
D.

claims were not

The Dissent

The dissent echoed the Third Circuit's finding that the Act
represents a carefully wrought balance of congressional objectives which would be upset by the inadequate warning claims.
The dissent accordingly exerted considerable effort to disprove
the majority's contention that the protection of commerce and

the national economy comprised a secondary goal of the Act.130
Section 1331, the dissent noted, plainly states that commerce

should be protected "to the maximum extent consistent with"
warning the public. The dissent also pointed out that the history

of the Act reveals that its passage was the result of a hardfought compromise between partisan forces, militating against
the conclusion that the warning goal trumps the protection of
40
commerce goal.
It is also interesting to note that the dissent directly ques-

tioned the'validity of the plaintiffs' substantive claims, something the circuit courts in other tobacco litigation only hinted at.
Once the congressional warning was in place, the dissenting
judge argued, people like Wilfred Dewey smoked at their own

risk. 141 The dissent also voiced fears, latent in the circuit court
text, manufacturers claim that because they complied with a federal standard which they
are entitled to rely upon, they cannot be held liable. As a rule, however, compliance with
a federal standard does not prevent a finding that a manufacturer was negligent. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 288C (1965). By contrast, in arguing preemption, a
manufacturer attempts to prove that the federal government specifically intended to bar
a plaintiff from contesting the adequacy of the federal standard. Because they focus on
the shortcomings of the compliance defense, MacDonald and Burch are of little probative value on the preemption issue central to Dewey.
18 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 94, 577 A.2d at 1251.
Id. at 101-02, 577 A.2d at 1256 (Antell, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 103-04, 577 A.2d at 1256 (Antell, J., dissenting).
...Id. at 108, 577 A.2d at 1259 (Antell, J., dissenting):
The federal legislation gives effect to the coordinate goals of protecting the
public with minimal consequences to the cigarette industry. It does this by
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opinions, that a flood of claims would engender judicial chaos.142
III.

ANALYSIS

The Dewey court's conclusions are compelling. In conducting its preemption analysis, the Dewey court properly accorded the state law at issue considerable weight. By contrast,
the circuit courts ran roughshod over the protections afforded
state law, and state common law in particular, in our federal system. Four arguments, all of which are touched on in Dewey,
strongly support the contention that the Act does not preempt
plaintiffs' post-1965 failure to warn and intentional misrepresentation claims. First, and perhaps most important, the cigarette
manufacturers have not managed to overcome the heightened
presumption against preemption. 143 Second, the Supreme Court
has exhibited an increased hesitancy to preempt state laws that
have the potential to infringe upon the congressional purposes
behind federal law, maintaining that Congress is often willing to
tolerate a certain degree of tension between federal and state
law. 144 In a parallel development, the Supreme Court has been
downplaying the effect that state damage actions have on various federal schemes, making it less likely that such claims will
be preempted.1 45 Third, there is a strong policy argument that
an injured party should not be left without means of redress. 140
This belief is shared by the Supreme Court, which is very wary
requiring that consumers be informed that cigarette smoking is "dangerous to
your health," reflecting a judgment that this was all an ordinary consumer
need to know to appreciate the risk of smoking and drawing the line at which
personal responsibility begins.
Id.See also Dewey, 121 N.J. at 106, 577 A.2d at 1258 (Antell, J., dissenting) ("[W]hereas
Silkwood was the hapless victim of a nuclear accident, here the decedent voluntarily
exposed himself to the risks of smoking in the face of a federally prescribed warning that
this would endanger his health.").
14 Dewey,121 N.J. at 108-09, 577 A.2d at 1259 ("[T]he extent to which the warning
can be particularized is infinite and that there are few cases of which it can be said that
the manufacturer adequately covered the myriad possibilities about which a consumer
could claim a warning should have been, but was not, given. Although Congress intended
to put the matter to rest, the decision of the majority allows for the very chaos which the
Act attempts to resolve.").
148 See notes 150-62 and accompanying text infra.
144 See notes 163-99 and accompanying text infra.
145 Id.
146 See notes 200-09 and accompanying text infra.
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of leaving an injured party without a remedy. 147 Fourth, the lack
of language in the Act expressly preempting state damage actions is especially telling in this instance, further supporting the
conclusion that state damage actions should not be preempted.148 These arguments strongly suggest that the Act does
not bar an individual from pursuing his common law right to
recover for injuries sustained by products with inadequate warnings.149 While the plaintiffs in these cases may have difficulty at
trial proving that the warnings mandated by the Act are inadequate, they should not be denied the opportunity to present
such claims.
A.

The Presumption Against Preemption
According to the principles of federalism, there is a proper

147

Id.

See notes 210-16 and accompanying text infra.
This Comment, which concentrates on the broader contours of preemption analysis, does not give an exhaustive, analytical account of the arguments that have surfaced
in favor of the plaintiffs. For instance, several courts have focused specifically on the
Act's legislative history and on subsequent federal tobacco legislation to show that Congress did not intend to preempt state tort claims. Recently, a Texas appellate court,
which echoed the finding of the Dewey court that the Act did not preempt any of the
plaintiffs' claims, noted that the legislative history of the Act and the language of the
1986 Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act (Smokeless Tobacco Act)
belied the defendants' preemption argument. Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d
498 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). Citing Judge Sarokin's Cipollone opinion, the Texas court
reemphasized that nowhere in the legislative history is there any mention that tort
claims would be preempted by the Act even though several cigarette product liability
cases were pending in the federal appellate courts at the time. Id. at 514. The Texas
court also pointed out that the very existence of debate in the legislative history concerning the effect of the Act on the substantive defense of assumption of risk is inconsistent
with the contention that Congress intended to preempt state tort claims. rd. See notes
59-62 and accompanying text supra for a full discussion of Judge Sarokin's treatment of
the legislative history.
The Texas appellate court also held that the Smokeless Tobacco Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
4401-4408 (1988), legislation that mandated warning labels on smokeless tobacco products, provides evidence that Congress did not intend to preempt state tort actions in the
Act. 805 S.W.2d at 514. The Smokeless Tobacco Act, which, like the Labeling Act,
preempts state regulation of the warnings on smokeless tobacco products, specifically
states: "[n]othing in this chapter shall relieve any person from liability at common law or
under state statutory law to any other person." 15 U.S.C. § 4406(c). This preemption
provision shows that Congress did not intend to immunize the chewing tobacco industry
from tort liability. Because there is no valid reason for Congress to distinguish between
the smokeless tobacco and cigarette industry or between the scope of liability either is to
face, this intent that the smokeless tobacco industry should pay tort damages should
carry over to the Labeling Act.
148

1'9
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allocation of power between federal and state authority. 1 0 The
judiciary has preserved this federal-state balance by establishing
the presumption that Congress does not intend to displace state
law when it enacts federal legislation."' This presumption
150 Alexander Hamilton articulated the basic tenet of federalism in THE

FEDERALIST.

An entire consolidation of the States into one corporate national sovereignty
would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might
remain in them, would be altogetlier dependent on the general will. But as the
plan of the [Constitutional] convention aims only at partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty
which they before had, and which were not, by that act exclusively delegated
to the United States.
THE FEDERALmST No. 32, at 243 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
In Gregory v. Ashcroft, a recent Supreme Court exposition on the principles of fed.
eralism, the Court alluded to Alexander Hamilton's and James Madison's espousal of a
healthy federal-state balance as a protection against federal tyranny. 111 S. Ct. 2395,
2400 (1991). The Gregory Court also invoked the Tenth Amendment as testimony to the
fact that states retain substantial sovereign authority under the United States constitutional system. Id. at 2399. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
2
See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (the preservation of the
federal-state balance requires a "presumption that Congress did not intend to displace
state law"). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed.
1988). Because Congress is the true arbiter of the federal-state balance and is entrusted
with protecting the sovereignty of the states, there is a presumption that Congress did
not intend to preempt state law.
The Supreme Court's most recent view of the federal-state balance was expounded
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., where the Court held that functions
traditionally performed by the state have no immunity from a particular federal regulation passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985). In other words,
Congress has exceedingly broad powers under the Commerce Clause and can regulate
virtually all forms of state activity. However, with great power comes great responsibility. As a corollary to the broad Commerce Clause power, the presumption against preemption provides a safeguard whereby Congress can only infringe on state sovereignty by
means of an explicit exercise of its lawmaking power. Indeed, Professor Tribe has indicated that, in light of Garcia, the presumption against preemption is perhaps more important than ever as an internal check on Congress's enhanced power. L. TRIBE, supra, §
6-25, at 479-80.
The Supreme Court, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, has recently endorsed Professor Tribe's
view of the effect of Garcia on the presumption against preemption. 111 S. Ct. 2395,
2403 (1991). The Court stated:
Indeed, inasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political
process the protection of the states against intrusive exercises of Congress'
Commerce powers, we must be absolutely certain the Congress intended such
an exercise. '[T]o give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the real procedure for lawmaking on which
Garcia relied to protect states' interests.'
Id. at 2403 (quoting L. TRmE, supra, § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988)).
In Gregory the Court held that Missouri's retirement age for judges did not violate
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against preemption is heightened when areas of historical state
concern, such as torts, are at issue.10 2 The presumption is further
heightened when preemption of state law would leave plaintiffs
without an adequate substitute remedy.1 53 Procedurally, this
presumption has the effect of putting a heavy burden of proof
on the cigarette companies to prove preemption.1 4
The Dewey court recognized that the presumption against
preemption barrier in the cigarette cases is formidable 1 55-certainly not one that the circuit courts or the New
Jersey appellate court effectively managed to overcome in allowing the preemption defense to stand. For instance, the First
Circuit in Palmer did not even make a pretense of addressing

the Federal Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA) largely on the grounds
that Congress did not explicitly extend the ADEA's reach to judges. The Court went to
considerable lengths to emphasize both the importance of state power in our federal system and the requirement that Congress speak with unmistakable clarity when it intends
to preempt state law. Id. at 2399-403. If Gregory is any indication, the recently realligned
Rehnquist Court will be especially vigilant in cases where federal law infringes upon
state sovereignty. See Greenhouse, A Remade Court Shifts The Fulcrum of Power, N.Y.
Times, July 7, 1991, §4, at 1, col. 4.
Note that in the cigarette cases, there is no question that the federal government
has the power under the Commerce Clause to preempt state tort claims. Rather, the
question is whether Congress intended to use that power to preempt such claims, the
presumption being that Congress did not.
152 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("Congress legislated
here in a field which the states have traditionally occupied .... (So we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the states were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.").
15 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984).
'5 See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 255 (party moving to preempt state law has burden of
proof); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313 (11th Cir. 1987) (burden of
proof is on the cigarette manufacturers to prove displacement of traditional tort
remedies).
55 In Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691, 696 (1983), rev'd, 437
N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989), a case cited at length in Dewey, the Minnesota Court of Appeals rested its entire analysis on the presumption against preemption:
In the present case, the traditional presumption against preemption is heightened by four factors. First, Congress has spoken on the issue of preemption
and not expressly preempted state tort claims. Second, the state law which
respondent attempts to displace relates to the health and safety of the citizens
of Minnesota and thus falls within the traditional domain of the states. Third,
examination of the Act's legislative history does not persuade us Congress intended to preempt tort claims. Finally, if state tort law is preempted, personal
injury victims would be left without a remedy - a situation which has not
been tolerated by either the United States Supreme Court or the Supreme
Court of Minnesota.
Id. at 696.
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the presumption against preemption.15 6 The Third Circuit in Cipollone, while recognizing the presumption against preemption,
skirted the issue in its implied preemption analysis, never acknowledging that the conflict between state and federal law
must be significant enough to evidence a "clear and manifest"
purpose on the part of Congress to displace state law. 1 7 The
Third Circuit instead used a two-step argument: 1) Congress
made it clear that any regulations enforcing a warning other
than that prescribed in section 1333(a) of the Act are preempted; 15 8 and 2) several Supreme Court opinions have held
that state law damage claims have a regulatory effect.15 0 From
this analysis, the Third Circuit gleaned that Congress must have
intended to preempt state tort claims. This inference is hardly
the equivalent of showing" that Congress had a "clear and manifest" purpose to displace state law.16 0
Of course it is difficult to say with any degree of exactitude
what sort of showing a party moving for preemption would have
to make to overcome this doubly heightened presumption. But,
in this instance, where Congress has not expressly preempted
state damage actions, where the legislative history reveals no intent to preempt such action (if anything, it reveals an intent to
preserve such actions), 6 1 where the federal government does not
have a dominant interest in the subject matter,1 62 and where the
Act does not provide any remedial scheme, it is exceedingly difficult to overcome the presumption. The circuit courts' conspicuous silence on the issue of the presumption stems from the very
fact that it was not overcome.

"' The Palmer court's only mention of the presumption against preemption was in
the context of discussing the Palmer district court's treatment of express preemption.
The fact that the Palmer court claimed to have "no hesitation in determining that the
Act impliedly preempts (under whatever rubric) the Palmers' claim" belies its failure to
consider seriously the presumption against preemption. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 625.
"I Cipollone, 593 F.2d at 185.
"'

Id. at 187.

59 Id. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156
(1982); Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311,
324-25 (1981). See note 87 supra for a full discussion of Fidelity and Kalo Brick.
0 Professor Tribe noted that the Third Circuit opinion seemed "hard to square
.. . with the overriding presumption that 'Congress did not intend to displace state
law.'" L. TRmE, supra, note 151, § 6-26, at 491 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting Maryland v. Loui.
siana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
"'
"'

See notes 59-62 and accompanying text supra.
See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
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B. Recent Developments Concerning "Obstacle Conflict"
Preemption
Any court engaged in determining whether a state law
stands as an obstacle to the federal law must gauge the effect
the state law will have on the purposes behind the federal law. 103
However, the Supreme Court has defined "obstacle" narrowly in
recent years; in certain cases even a state law having a direct
and substantial effect on a federal scheme will not comprise an
obstacle to a federal scheme. 1 " Congress, the Supreme Court has
indicated, is often willing to accept significant tension between
state and federal law. Furthermore, the Supreme Court seems to
be particularly reluctant to preempt state damage actions. The
Court has recognized that a party subject to a state damage action is not in the same situation as a party faced with state regulation; the former will change its behavior only when it is cost
effective to do so, while the latter is forced to change its behavior.165 State damage actions are thus less likely to stand as an

"obstacle" to a federal scheme because a party subject to such
actions will not necessarily alter its behavior in such a way that
infringes upon the federal law. A manufacturer may respond to
tort liability in a variety of ways. The Dewey court properly concluded that Brown & Williamson "overstate[d]" the effect of the
tort claims on the Act:"66 preserving tort claims would have only
would not stand as an "oban indirect effect upon the Act and
16 7
stacle" under the Hines analysis.

Recent cases have shown that the Supreme Court is hesitant to find state law preempted on the grounds that it stands as
an "obstacle" to the purposes behind the federal law. In Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
6
a California state
1 the Court considered whether
Comm'n,1

1'3 Fineberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 63 (3d Cir. 1980) ('[The Hines] te3t require3
us to examine first the purposes of the federal law and second the effect of the operation
of the state law on these purposes.").
164 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Cormm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). See notes 168-73 and accompanying text infra for a full
discussion of Pacific Gas.
1M5 See English v. General Electric Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2279 (1990); Miller v. Goodyear Atomic Corp., 486 U.S. 174, 186 (1988). See notes 182-88 and accompanying text
infra for a full discussion of English and Miller.
"I Dewey, 121 N.J. at 90, 577 A.2d at 1249.
"6 See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
16 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
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moratorium on nuclear power plant construction was preempted
by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA).169 The Court first noted that
while Congress intended to occupy the field of nuclear safety, it
left the states free to regulate the economic aspects of nuclear
power. 17 0 Because the moratorium was motivated at least in part
by economic concerns, the Court held that the moratorium did
not encroach upon the federally occupied field of nuclear
safety.1 7 The Court's next consideration was whether the moratorium would stand as an obstacle to the congressional objective
behind the AEA of promoting the commercial use of nuclear
power. 172 The Court held that while Congress did evince a clear
intent to promote nuclear power, it did not intend to do so "at
all costs" and allowed the state moratorium to stand despite the
possibility that it would fully frustrate the congressional purpose
73
behind the AEA.2
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.'7 4 is particularly relevant to
the cigarette cases because it involved the preservation of state
damage actions in the face of a federal scheme. In Silkwood, the
estate of Karen Silkwood brought a suit based on common law
tort principles for plutonium contamination injuries and was
awarded both compensatory and punitive damages from the
Kerr-McGee Corporation.17 5 Relying on its earlier interpretation
of the AEA in Pacific Gas, the Court found that Congress had
invested the federal government with exclusive power over the
regulation of nuclear safety.17 However, the Court also found
evidence in certain amendments to the AEA, requiring nuclear
operators under certain circumstances to obtain private financial
protection in case of nuclear accidents, that Congress assumed
that state remedies were available to those injured in nuclear
accidents.1 7 7 In its Hines analysis, the majority noted that there

42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1976).
Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 206-07.
171 Id. at 214-16.
170

172

Id. at 204.

...Id. at 222. See Kim, Preemption After Cipollone:Preserving State Tort Remedies in the Face of Federal Regulation, 20 TOLEDO L. REV. 797, 812 (1989) ("The Su.

preme Court in Pacific Gas upheld a state moratorium that threatened to bar completely
the achievement of the federal goal of promoting commercial nuclear development.").
174 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
175 Id. at 241-44.
'7
17

Id. at 249.
Id. at 251. The court referred to the Price-Anderson Act, under which the Nu-
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was a "tension" between allowing state tort liability and the
finding that the federal government occupied the field of nuclear
safety but added that it was a tension that Congress was willing
to accept.17 The majority also noted that the purpose behind

the AEA would not be frustrated by state law liability because
Congress did not intend to promote nuclear power at the expense of leaving victims of nuclear mishaps without a remedy,
and it accordingly granted both compensatory and punitive
damages to the plaintiffs.179 The dissent, on the other hand, insisted that an award of punitive damages would upset the AEA's
scheme. By way of explanation, Justice Blackmun made an important distinction between punitive and compensatory damages.180 Punitive damages have a regulatory purpose aimed specifically at deterring conduct and thus would upset the
accommodation between federal regulations and state common
law. Justice Blackmun, nevertheless, agreed with the majority
that compensatory damages have only an indirect regulatory impact and that allowing compensatory damages would not frustrate the purpose of the AEA.181

clear Regulatory Commission is given discretion whether to require licensed nuclear
plants to maintain financial protection. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976)).
278 Silkwod, 464 U.S. at 256.
170 Id.
180 Id. at 263 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 264 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see Palmer, 825 F.2d at 628. The
Palmer court went to considerable lengths to distinguish Silkwood from the cigarette
cases. The court first noted that, unlike the Act, the federal law at issue in Silhwood, the
AEA, contained no preemption provision. Second, whereas the Act left no role to the
states in the labeling and advertising of cigarettes, the AEA expressly reserved significant authority for the states.
These arguments are not sufficient to dismiss the Silkwood analogy. First, in Pacific
Gas, the Supreme Court concluded that the federal government occupied the field of
nuclear safety, signifying that the absence of a preemption provision did not lessen the
AEA's preemptive reach to all areas of nuclear safety. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. 190, 212
(1983). Second, the Pacific Gas Court held that the only authority reserved to the states
by the AEA was over the economic aspects of nuclear power. Id. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2018,
2021(b), 2021(k). No authority over nuclear safety, which was at issue in Silkweed, was
granted to the states by the AEA.
The Palmer court, however, made an additional point in attempting to distinguish
the federal scheme at issue in Silkwood from the Act: The Price-Anderson Act, a 1957
amendment to the AEA, set up an indemnification scheme whereby operators of nuclear
facilities could be required to obtain private financial protection against state lawsuits in
the event of a nuclear catastrophe. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976). This, the Silkwood majority reasoned, stood as evidence that
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The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in English v.

General Electric Co. 18 2 In English, an employee at a nuclear fa-

cility was dismissed by General Electric, allegedly in retaliation
for her whistleblowing.183 She proceeded to bring a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court held that
English's state law claim was not preempted by federal law even
though the Federal Energy Reorganization Act had remedial
provisions for retaliatory dismissal which would potentially be
jeopardized by allowing state law claims.184 The Court, in a
unanimous decision, noted that even though allowing state tort
claims might have some tangential effect upon the "resource allocation" safety decisions of nuclear operators, and thereby possibly interfere with Congress's intention that the federal government regulate nuclear safety to the exclusion of state law, the
effect was neither direct nor substantial enough to warrant preCongress did not intend to preempt nuclear injury tort claims. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
Accordingly, the Palmer court opined that the Silkwood case was not instructive: the
Silkwood Court had found explicit evidence in the legislative history that Congress did
not intend to preempt nuclear injury tort claims, whereas there was no explicit evidence
in the Act's language or legislative history that Congress did not intend to preempt cigarette injury tort claims. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 628.
However, the Palmer court's analysis overlooks the Supreme Court's more general
finding that Congress was willing to accept the "tension" between whatever regulatory
consequences allowing state tort claims might have and the determination that safety
regulation is the exclusive concern of federal law. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256. State tort
claims may be allowable even if Congress has occupied the field. The Silkwood majority
also found that allowing state law claims would not frustrate Congress's purpose of promoting nuclear power because Congress did not intend to do so "at all costs." Id.at 257.
Certainly these broad holdings apply in determining the preemptive reach of the Act, in
which uniform labeling was a goal, not to be achieved at all costs, but rather to be
achieved "consistent with" the goal of informing the public of the hazards of smoking.
Moreover, observations by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Silkwood about the
nature of compensatory damages also lend support to the contention that failure to warn
claims should be allowed despite the Act. 464 U.S. at 263-64. The purpose of compensatory damages is to compensate victims, Blackmun noted, and an award of such damages
has only an indirect impact upon the behavior of a nuclear operator. "Whatever compensation standard a State imposes. . . a licensee remains free to continue operating under
federal standards and to pay for the injury that results." Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 264.
While the compensatory damage claims at issue in the cigarette cases could potentially
have a greater economic impact on the tobacco industry than the damage claim at issue
in Silkwood could have on the nuclear power industry, the impact of such cigarette injury claims would nonetheless be nonregulatory and indirect in nature.
182 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990).
183 Id.at 2271-72.
184 Id. at 2278.
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emption of the plaintiff's tort claim.18 5
In Miller v. Goodyear Atomic Corp.,1 88 an employee at a nu-

clear production facility sustained injuries due to the facility's
failure to comply with a state safety regulation and brought a

claim against the facility for additional workers' compensation
benefits. The Court held that the plaintiff's claim against the

facility under an Ohio workers' compensation law was not preempted by the AEA. The Court noted that direct state regulation of a federal facility is distinct from the incidental regulatory

effect that results when a state workers' compensation law is applied to provide additional awards to injured workers.

s7

Such an

award was considered incidental because the federal facility
could "choose" to disregard the state safety regulation and
award compensation.1 88

In summary, the Supreme Court has held recently in Pacific
Gas,189 Silkwood 9 ° and English8 1 that when state law and a
federal regulatory scheme come into conflict, state law will not
be preempted unless it infringes on the object of the federal reg-

ulation substantially or directly. In other words, there is an elasticity of tension that can be tolerated before preemption is triggered. In a corollary development, the Supreme Court held, in

Silkwood, 92 Miller"'3 and English"" that it does not view state
tort claims, at least insofar as they are for compensatory damages, as comprising direct regulation, moving away from its 1959
holding in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon.205 This

185Id. at 2279-81. But see Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1223 (1st
Cir. 1990). The plaintiff in Kotler, the surviving spouse of a decedent smoher, argued
that Palmerv. Liggett Group, Inc., the First Circuit's precedent on cigarette presumption, should be reconsidered in light of the Supreme Court's decision in English. Id. at
1222. The First Circuit disagreed. Noting that there were gaping differences between the
Energy Reorganization Act, at play in English, and the Labeling Act, in Palmer, the
court held that English did not affect the validity of Palmer.Id. at 1223.
188 486 U.S. 174 (1988).
187 Id. at 177.
18

Id. at 186.

189 461 U.S. 190 (1983).

19'464
191 110
192 464
183 486
1- 110

U.S. 238 (1984).
S. Ct. 2270 (1990).

U.S. 238 (1984).
U.S. 174 (1988).
S. Ct. 2270 (1990).

359 U.S. 236 (1959). See notes 124-25 supra for a discussion of Garmon. See also
Stein, supra note 11, at 652 n.147.
185
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conclusion rests on the determination that nuclear facility operators have a choice of reacting to state tort claims through resource allocation decision making whereas they do not when
faced with state regulation."' 6 These parallel developments in
the Supreme Court cases narrow the parameters of the "obstacle
conflict" preemption, mandating preemption only where there is
effective state regulation directly obstructing the purposes behind the federal law.
Applying these recent Supreme Court decisions to the cigarette cases, one can have little doubt that the Act and inadequate warning claims can coexist. While there is tension between
allowing state court claims and the Act's goal of protecting national commerce, this tension is far from fatal. Rather, the Supreme Court makes it clear that allowing tort claims, which are
part of the states' historic police powers, is acceptable as long as
such claims do not substantially and directly affect congressional
purposes. Contrary to the circuit court opinions, inadequate
warning claims do not directly compromise the Act's goal of uniformity. The circuit courts' approach simply rests on too many
contingencies. First, a considerable number of plaintiffs would
have to wage successful suits before a manufacturer would contemplate changing the warning; this result is far from a given
considering the fact that cigarette products liability suits have
been entirely unsuccessful in the past.19 7 Second, these suits
would have to challenge successfully the present warning labels,
in place since 1984. A determination that the earlier warning labels were inadequate would have no bearing on the adequacy of
present labels and thus could hardly serve as an incentive to
manufacturers to strengthen the present label. Third, the form
P' See Ausness, supra note 11, at 926-27 (1988); G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS oF AcciDENTs: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 68-128 (1970).

Governmental regulations and substantive tort law are essentially different. Dean
Calabresi illustrates this point by dividing accident cost avoidance methods into two categories: general deterrence and specific deterrence. Under principles of general deter.
rence, the mechanism behind tort liability, it is the market which determines managerial
decisions about accident cost measures, allowing manufacturers to internalize the costs
of compensating injured consumers. G. CALABRESI, supra at 68-69. Manufacturers faced
with liability will make their products safer, but only as long as it is cost effective to do
so. In contrast, specific deterrence, under which category governmental regulations fall,
mandates particular cost avoidance measures, taking the decision-making function away
from the market and management. Id. at 95.
...See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1168 n.17. See also note 74 supra.
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of a manufacturer's reaction to liability will not necessarily conflict with the Act. The manufacturer has the option of placing a
package insert in the product or simply deciding not to alter the
warning label when it is not cost-effective to do so.103 Finally,
manufacturers may react by strengthening their labels uniformly, wholly in conformity with the goals of the Act. Indeed,
the case for allowing such claims may in fact be stronger than in
Silkwood, Miller and English because such claims, by airing specific hazards of smoking, have the additional effect of promoting
the explicit congressional purpose of warning the public of the
dangers of smoking. 9 9
C.

Compensatory Goals of Tort Law

The Dewey court makes much of the fact that state tort law
has broader compensatory goals than federal law.200 Indeed, one

of the foundational bases of tort law is the compensation of injured victims. 0 1 Furthermore, states have long taken an interest
in compensating citizens who are injured by defective products.2 02 Federal safety regulations as a rule are designed only to
See Dewey, 121 N.J. at 90, 577 A.2d at 1249.
The cigarette cases have arguably increased public awareness of possible deception on the part of the cigarette manufacturers. In a pretrial ruling in the Cipollone case,
Judge Sarokin held that all discovery documents entered into evidence that could not be
proven to be confidential were not protected from public disclosure. Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 87 (D.N.J. 1986). This ruling led to the dissemination of some
potentially damaging documents concerning what the tobacco companies knew about the
hazards of smoking and when they knew it. This ruling generated considerable media
interest. Singer, CigarettePapers, ALL LAw., May 1988, at 91, 93.
200 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 90-91, 577 A.2d at 1249.50.
201 See H. STREET, THE LAW OF ToS 4 (7th ed. 1983) ("[T]he essential aim of the
law of torts is to compensate those who have suffered harm through the invasion of certain of their interests occasioned by the conduct of others.").
See, e.g., Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 263 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe purpose of
compensatory damages is to compensate victims."); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736
F.2d 1529, 1540 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 104 (1984) ("State tort law, in con"); Cipollone, 593 F.
trast [to federal law], may have broader compensatory goals ....
Supp. at 1155 ("Indeed, compensation is the very purpose of tort liability in this state
and elsewhere.").
See Stein, supra note 11, at 652 n.147. The author notes that state damage claims
were viewed as having an impermissible regulatory impact when brought in an area governed by federal law in the 1950s, and were consequently preempted. However, throughout the 1980s, courts have considered the primary purpose of state tort law to he compensation of victims, distinct from the regulatory objective of federal statutes, and
allowed such claims to proceed.
202 See, e.g., Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1542 ("The provision of tort remedies to compen101
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deter conduct and prevent injury while doing nothing to make
the victim whole.203
Indeed, as a matter of public policy, there is a strong argument that these tort claims should be preserved.2 0 It would be
manifestly unfair to leave a plaintiff without means of seeking

sate for personal injuries 'is a subject matter of the kind [the] Court has traditionally
regarded as properly within the scope of state superintendence .... "' (quoting Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963))); Feldman v. Lederle
Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 461, 479 A.2d 374, 390-91 (1984) ("[T]here is a strong state
interest in compensating those who are injured by a manufacturer's defective
products.").
103 See Kim, supra note 173, at 813. See also Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 263 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he Federal Government does not regulate the compensation of victims ....I%
2" The Dewey court's focus on the compensatory purpose of tort law works primarily as a policy argument, rather than a purely legal argument. In order to determine
whether state law stands as an obstacle to the federal law in question, the court must
examine "first the purposes of the federal law and second the effect of the operation of
the state law on these purposes." Fineberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 63 (3d Cir. 1980)
(emphasis supplied) (citing Perez v. Campell, 402 U.S. 637, 650-52 (1971)). As the district court in Cipollone conceded, the court, when addressing "actual conflict," is obligated to focus, not on the purpose of the state law but on the effect of the state law on
the federal scheme. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1166 n.14. The effect of state law claims
on the federal scheme is the same whether the articulated purpose of the claim be compensatory or regulatory; cigarette manufacturers will be faced with the same liability.
However, by that same token, the Fourth Circuit has expressly held that policy determinations play a major role in determining if the state law is preempted through actual conflict. Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1113 (4th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, in Abbot, the court held that the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201300 (1981), and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1986),
and the FDA's regulation of prescription drugs did not preempt failure to warn claims
against manufacturers of child vaccines.
Furthermore, several courts have specifically rejected the notion that the purpose
behind the state law in question has no place in the Hines preemption calculus. A Texas
appellate court addressing the cigarette preemption issue recently stated, "Although the
purpose of a state law is not a major factor to be considered in deciding preemption
questions, Perez v. Campell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971), it cannot be ignored, Pacific
Gas & Electric, 461 U.S. at 216." Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 512
(1991). This statement is borne out by Pacific Gas. In Pacific Gas, the Court considered
California's alleged economic rather than safety rationale for enacting a moratorium on
the certification of new nuclear plants in determining whether the state moratorium was
preempted by the AEA, (which gave the federal government control over the safety aspects of nuclear power). The Court accepted California's nonsafety rationale and ruled
both that the state statute lay outside the federally occupied field of nuclear safety regulation and did not frustrate the federal goal of developing nuclear power as a source of
energy. 461 U.S. 190, 216-23 (1983). The Pacific Gas Court distinguished Perez, implying
that if there was not an absolute conflict between state and federal law, as there was in
Perez, the Court would look at the purpose behind the state law in determining whether
it was preempted. 461 U.S. at 216-17 n.28.
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redress. The heavy presumption against preemption of state
common law, which is heightened when the federal law does not
provide for an adequate remedy, testifies to the important public policy considerations of victim compensation that come into
play in any preemption analysis. By preempting state tort law in
the cigarette cases, the courts abrogate the state's historic police
power to redress the injuries of its citizens-a determination
that requires a stronger showing of congressional intent to preempt than the circuit courts have supplied.
This policy argument is strengthened by the Supreme
Court's well-documented hostility to leaving claimants without
adequate legal remedies. Starting with United Constr. Workers
v. Laburnum Constr. Co.,20 5 the Supreme Court has consistently
refused to preempt state tort actions on the ground that a state
has a historical interest in protecting the health of its citizens
and because the Court is hesitant to deprive claimants of an adequate remedy. 0 6 This reasoning has been reiterated recently in
347 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1954) (the Court refused to preempt a tort action brought
by an injured worker even though the tort in question also constituted an unfair labor
practice for which certain administrative remedies were available under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947).
2 See Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691, 700 (Minn. App.
1988), rev'd, 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989):
Laburnum is the first in a long line of labor cases in which the Supreme Court
has refused to preempt state tort actions, notwithstanding comprehensive federal labor regulations, because of the state interest in promoting the health and
welfare of its citizens and because of the lack of an alternative remedy. See,
e.g., International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Linn v. United Plant Guard
Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, 430 U.S. 290 (1977); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
County District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
423 N.W.2d at 700.
But cf. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d at 627. The Palmer court cited three
cases for the proposition that the Supreme Court often leaves parties without remedies
by finding state common law preempted. However, the reading the Palmer court gives
these cases is decidedly strained.
In Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., the Supreme
Court did hold that the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) preempted a negligence cause of
action against a regulated railroad, but the Court made quite clear that the claimant had
adequate opportunity to plead his case through channels provided by the ICA. 450 U.S.
311 (1981). Indeed, Justice harshall noted that the ICA "spells out with considerable
provision the remedies available to a shipper who is injured." Id. at 321-22.
In Farmers Union v. WDAY, Inc., the Court did hold in a 5-4 decision that the
Federal Communications Act preempted a state libel claim against a radio station for
statements made by a candidate for public office during a broadcast that the station was
205
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Silkwood,207 County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation20 8 and
InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellette.209 Indeed, the Act has no
remedial provision to compensate those allegedly injured
through cigarette manufacturers' labeling or advertising policies,
in effect leaving a vacuum filled by state law. In short, the
Dewey court's compensation argument is buttressed by both
policy and Supreme Court precedent.

required to air. 360 U.S. 525 (1959). However, the plaintiff in that case still had a litigable claim against the political candidate. In addition, Justice Frankfurter lambasted the
majority's preemption finding as resting on "hypothesizing congressional acquiesenco
and by supposing 'conflicting' state law" and noted the "unfairness" in leaving the claim.
ant without a remedy. Id. at 546. Justice Frankfurter's preemption views have prevailed
in the more recent Supreme Court cases. See notes 163-88 supra.
In Duke Power Co. v. CarolinaEnvtl. Study Group, Inc., the Court held that an
environmental group which claimed they had suffered reasonably foreseeable injuries as
a result of the erection of a nuclear power plant did have standing to challenge the PriceAnderson Act, which limited liability of nuclear facilities in the event of nuclear catastrophe. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). The Court eventually determined that the Price-Anderson Act
did not violate the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The full context of the
Duke Power cite reveals a significantly different meaning from the one gleaned by the
Palmer court: "Initially it is not at all clear that the Due Process Clause in fact requires
that a legislatively enacted compensation scheme duplicate the recovery at common law
or provide a reasonable substitute remedy. However, we need not resolve this question
here, since the Price-Anderson Act does, in our view, provide a reasonably just substitute
for the common-law or state tort law remedies it replaces." Id. 438 U.S. at 88. This is a
far cry from saying that the "Supreme Court has often left parties without a remedy by
finding state common law preempted." Palmer, 825 F.2d at 627.
207 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984). The fact that Congress did not expressly preempt state
law "takes on added significance in light of Congress' failure to provide any federal remedy for persons injured by such conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress would,
without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct." Id.
20' 470 U.S. 226, 236-40 (1985). In Oneida, the Court held that an action under federal common law by Indian tribes against two New York counties for damages representing the fair rental value of land occupied by the counties was not preempted by the NonIntercourse Act of 1793. See 1 Stat. 329, 330 (1793). In doing so, the Court rested much
of its decision on the fact that the Non-Intercourse Act did not provide for remedies for
Indians displaced from their land. Oneida, 470 U.S. at 237-38.
209 479 U.S. 481 (1987). In InternationalPaperCo. v. Ouellette, the Court held that
a nuisance suit by Vermont landowners against a New York pulp and paper mill operator was preempted insofar as the action was based on Vermont law but also held that the
claimants could bring a nuisance suit under the law of New York, the source of the
pollution. The Court opined that the suit based on the affected state's law was preempted largely because the Clean Water Act represents an "all-encompassing program of
water pollution regulation," which included its own remedial provisions. Id. at 492 (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981)). In preserving the claims of the Vermont property owners under New York law, the Court emphasized the importance of not
leaving an injured party without a remedy. 479 U.S. at 497.

1991]

D.

STATE TORT PREEMPTION

The Act Does Not Expressly Preempt Tort Claims

The Dewey court's stress on express preemption at the end
of its analysis is very apt.210 The most reliable indicator of what
Congress intended to preempt is what it expressly preempted in
the statute.21 ' In the cigarette cases, where all courts addressing
the issue have agreed that Congress did not expressly preempt
state tort claims in the Act, the lack of express preemption
stands as strong evidence that Congress did not intend to preempt state common law claims at all. First, Congress can always
expressly preempt state tort claims when it wants to,21 2 and has
not infrequently done so in the past.213 Second, where Congress
was fully aware that failure to warn claims were pending against
cigarette manufacturers at the time of the passage of the Act,
the absence of a provision expressly preempting such claims
takes on added significance, further suggesting that Congress did
not intend to preempt such claims.2 ' Third, where the subject
matter at issue has generally been left to the states, the Supreme Court seems to attach great significance to the absence of
language of express preemption in the federal statute or regulation. In CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America, a case involving the
validity of an Indiana corporate antitakeover law, the Court emphasized that the lack of a provision in the federal statute ex210 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 93-94, 577 A.2d at 1251. See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. 190, 203
(1983). Express preemption occurs when Congress expressly states in an act or its legislative history that it intends to preempt state law.
"I See Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Minn. App.
1988), rev'd, 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989) ("There is no more reliable indication of what
Congress intended to preempt on a given subject than what it expressly preempted in
the statute.").
Implied preemption, on the other hand, requires a less-than-precise attempt to uncover Congressional intent. See Tribe, supra note 136, at 788-89. Professor Tribe notes
that there are "manifest dangers in trying to discern the tune when listening to the
sounds of congressional silence."
212 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 US. 767, 780
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Any indulgence in construction should be in favor
of the States, because Congress can speak with drastic clarity whenever it chooses to
assure full federal authority ....
).
13 See, e.g., Domestic Housing and International Recovery and Financial Stability
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z-17(d), 1715z-18(e) (1983); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §
301(a); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) & (c)(1).
214 Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1161. See also Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco
Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), afl'd on rehearing,350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1009 (1967) (warranty of fitness for use and negligent failure to warn).
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pressly preempting certain state antitakeover laws, an area usually left to the states, stood as evidence that Congress did not
intend to preempt such state law.2 15 Fourth, where Congress has
expressly preempted state regulation, as it did in the Act, failure
to expressly preempt state common law claims stands as additional evidence that Congress did not intend to preempt such
claims.210 When Congress does not expressly preempt state common law claims in a statute, the conclusion may therefore be
drawn that it did not intend to preempt such claims.
The heightened presumption against preemption, together
with the absence of a provision in the Act expressly preempting
state damage actions and the Supreme Court's restrained interpretations of the "obstacle conflict" category of preemption
mandate the conclusion that such claims are not preempted. Evidence that a remedial vacuum would be created if such state
tort law claims were to be preempted further suggests that such
claims should be preserved. The Dewey court was carefully observant of the presumption against preemption and the special
deference afforded state law claims by the Supreme Court when
conducting a preemption analysis, and it correctly held that
such claims were not preempted. The circuit courts gave insufficient consideration to these concerns and erroneously held that
the cigarette plaintiffs' claims were barred by the Act.

IV.

THE CIGARETTE CASES HIGHLIGHT THE INADEQUACIES OF THE

Hines DOCTRINE
While the Dewey court made a convincing case that inadequate warning claims do not stand as an obstacle to the Act, the
preemption controversy in the cigarette cases, as a whole, accents the inherent flaws in the "obstacle" conflict test itself. The
"obstacle conflict" category of preemption was first articulated
by Justice Black in Hines v. Davidowitz,21 7 where he noted that
the Court's primary role in preemption cases is to determine

25 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987) (holding that the Williams Act, regulations which govern
corporate tender offers, did not preempt an Indiana Act aimed at tender offers, despite
the fact that state law would delay the consummation of tender offers). The Court noted
that "[t]he longstanding prevalence of state regulation in this area suggests that, if Con.
gress had intended to pre-empt all state laws that delay the acquisition of voting control
following a tender offer, it would have said so explicitly." Id.
216 See Forster,423 N.W.2d at 696.
217

312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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whether state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."21 This doctrine has since become a standard in constitutional preemption analysis.219 However, many commentators
have criticized the doctrine, holding that it leaves courts too
much discretion in construing both the congressional purposes
behind the federal law and what would stand as an obstacle to
those purposes and thus does not provide sufficient safeguards
for state law.220 Some courts, vexed with the diaphanous nature
218 Id. In Hines, the 6-3 majority concluded that a Pennsylvania law which imposed
strict registration requirements on aliens was rendered invalid by the passage of the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940, which provided for a one-time registration of aliens.
The Court rested its preemption analysis on three bases: 1) the federal government has a
dominant interest in immigration, id. at 68; 2) the federal statute set up a comprehensive
scheme, a "single integrated and all-embracing system," id. at 74; and 3) the character of
the obligations imposed by the federal law was to preserve rather than curtail the rights
and liberties of aliens, making a finding of preemption easier, id. at 70. Underlying the
Court's preemption analysis is a hostility to state laws that unequally burden aliens. The
now-famous Hines preemption test ("[o]ur primary function is to determine whether
... [state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress") was essentially dicta. Id. at 67. The Court based
its preemption finding primarily on the three factors mentioned above rather than on the
"obstacle conflict" test. Indeed, the "obstacle conflict" test engendered in Hines was unwarranted on the facts of the case.
In response, the dissent noted that the federal act did not in any way conflict with
the state statutes. Id. at 78. The dissent also expounded a far more rigorous test for
preemption: "an exercise by the state of its police power... is superseded only where
the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct and positive' that the two acts cannot 'be fairly
reconciled or consistently stand together."' (citing Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.. 1, 10
(1938)). 312 U.S. at 80.
219 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dey.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 220-21 (1983) ("It is well established that state law is pre-empted
if it 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.' "); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cue3ta, 458 U.S.
141, 153 (1982); Florida Lime & Avocado Groweis, Inc. v. Paul, 373 US. 132, 14243
(1963).
22 See, e.g., Rothschild, A Proposed "Tonic" With Florida Lime to Celebrate Our
New Federalism How to Deal with the "Headache" of Preemption, 38 U. MAm L Ray.
829, 854 (1983). Professor Rothschild would dispose of the "obstacle conflict" analysis
altogether, and replace it with the "physical impossibility" test as articulated in Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
This Comment does not address whether the Hines test should be abandoned entirely, but merely suggests that the Hines test should not be applied when state common
law claims are at issue. A coherent distinction can be made between state common law
claims and state regulations in the preemption context First, a tort claim doe3 not have
an absolutely ascertainable impact-it invites speculation surrounding its effect which a
state regulation does not. Accordingly, in determining that a state law stands as an obstacle under the Hines test, a court is forced to speculate to a greater degree than it
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of the Hines test, have implicitly called it into question. 2

1

The

would if a state regulation were at issue. Second, state tort law is compensatory in nature
whereas state regulations generally are not. Courts, worried about creating a remedial
vacuum, are hesitant to find that state tort law stands as an obstacle to federal law. See
notes 200-09 and accompanying text supra. Third, common law claims are more preemption-resistant than state statutory or regulatory law because common law is often the
result of long and careful judicial development. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1152; Iconoco
v. Jensen Constr. Co., 622 F.2d 1291, 1296 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that a tort claim did
not present an obstacle to the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-647 (1976), largely
because of the overriding state interest, "historically, and deeply rooted in its commonlaw tradition," in redressing torts). Finally, and more important, unlike most state legislation, state tort law is an axiomatic part of the historic police powers of the states,
powers that are afforded extra protection against preemption. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). There already being a heightened presumption against
preemption where state common law is concerned, it is not too great an analytical leap to
exempt tort law from "obstacle conflict" preemption altogether. See Note, A Framework
for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
221 The Dewey court itself was obviously wary of the Hines "obstacle conflict" analysis. In outlining its approach to determine if there is an actual conflict, the court did
not quote the usual language from the body of the Hines decision, but rather quoted
from Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912), to which the Hines Court devoted a
footnote. Dewey, 121 N.J. at 87, 577 A.2d at 1247. The language of Savage, that state law
will only be preempted "[i]f the purpose of the [federal] act cannot otherwise be accomplished - [] its operation within its chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused and their natural effect," Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. at 533, is certainly
more qualified than the language of Hines, that state law will be preempted when it
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of [federal purposes]." Hines, 312 U.S. at
67. Second, the Dewey court emphasized that a potential or hypothetical conflict would
not be sufficient to preempt state law. To this effect, the court quoted Justice Stone's
dissenting opinion in Hines, where he cautioned against resting preemption on "vague
inferences." Hines, 312 U.S. at 75. Finally, the court's conclusion that Congress could
always have expressly preempted state common law was an implicit criticism of the
Hines doctrine.
The Fourth Circuit, in Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., recognized that courts
may be quite whimsical when engaged in a Hines analysis: "While preemption under a
theory of express or implied preemption is essentially a matter of statutory construction,
preemption under a frustration of federal purpose theory is more an exercise of policy
choices by a court than strict statutory construction." 844 F.2d 1108, 1113 (4th Cir.
1988).
A restrained view of actual conflict preemption calling the Hines doctrine into question has also surfaced in Supreme Court decisions. In FloridaLime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul,the Court held that a California agricultural statute was not preempted by a
federal statute touching on the same subject. 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). In doing so,
the Court adopted and applied a new and more rigorous test for actual preemption,
whether "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,"
and found that both statutes could be complied with simultaneously. Id. Indeed, the
adoption of the "physical impossibility" test seems to have been motivated by the
Court's frustration with the Hines doctrine. Id. See Rothschild, supra note 220, at 85758.
In Jones v. Rath Packing Co., the Court held that a California statute which required flour packages to list the net weight without permitting variations for loss of
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flaws in the doctrine have been thoroughly revealed in the cigarette cases, where the circuit courts have construed broadly both
Congress's commerce protection goal and the effects of state tort
claims on those goals, to the detriment of state tort law.222 This
Comment argues that the Hines doctrine should not be applied
when state tort law is at issue. First, the Hines doctrine, by virtue of its very language, gives courts too little guidance in analyzing preemption cases.223 Second, the Hines doctrine does not
require courts to give adequate recognition to the compensatory
goals of tort law. 22 ' Third, the Hines doctrine cannot easily be
reconciled with the heightened presumption against preemption.2 25 In sum, the Hines doctrine should be abandoned by
courts when determining whether state common law claims are
preempted.
The Hines doctrine allows for entirely too much federal incursion on state common law. The operative language of Hines,
"obstacle" and "full purposes of Congress" 22 0 is very broad, giving courts little guidance.227 In determining whether state commoisture after packing, stood as an obstacle to the objective of the federal statute, which
also required labels to list the net weight but allowed for variations due to moisture loss.
430 U.S. 519 (1977). In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist vociferously objected to the majority's expansive interpretation of the obstacle conflict doctrine stating that the majority
"seriously misapprehends the carefully delimited nature of the doctrine of preemption."
Id. at 549. His dissent makes reference to several stringent formulations of the actual
conflict test, noticeably avoiding the Hines formulation. For instance, Justice Rehnquist
cited Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937), which held that the exercise of its
police power by a state would be superseded by federal law "only where the repugnance
or conflict is so 'direct and positive' that the two acts cannot be 'reconciled or consistently stand together."' 430 U.S. at 518. Justice Rehnquist also quoted passages from
Savage, 225 U.S. 501 (1912), 430 U.S. at 546, and Goldstein v. California, 412 US. 546,
554-55 (1973), 430 U.S. at 545, both to the effect that there must be a definite conflict
between state and federal law that entirely frustrates the federal law before state law will
be preempted. The proper inquiry according to Justice Rehnquist was "whether the two
statutory schemes are in utter conflict." 430 U.S. at 544. In this case, Rehnquist discerned only a potential conflict between the California statute and the federal law, which
was insufficient to preempt state law.
I= See notes 79-98 and accompanying text supra.
The Palmer court's reformulation of the Hines test brings to light the inherent
vagueness of the test: "If the state law disturbs too much the congressionally declared
scheme.., it will be displaced through the force of preemption." Palmer, 825 F.2d at
626.
See notes 226-31 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 232-36 and accompanying text infra.
='See notes 237-40 and accompanying text infra.
228 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.

I" See Comment, Common Law Claims ChallengingAdequacy of Cigarette Warn-
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mon law stands as an obstacle or frustrates congressional purposes, courts are virtually forced to proceed in an abstract
fashion. If a court is antagonistic to the state law, it will be
tempted to envisage potential situations in which state law will
stand as an obstacle to federal law.2 2 8 In the cigarette cases, the
circuit courts foresaw plaintiffs bringing a flood of failure to
warn actions, forcing cigarette companies faced with massive liability to strengthen their warnings. While this scenario is conceivable, it is nonetheless hypothetical. To begin with, no plaintiff has yet won a suit against the cigarette manufacturers.
Moreover, courts should note the large number of suits that
would have to be successful before a manufacturer would feel
compelled to change its warnings.229 It must also be taken into
consideration that these suits would have to demonstrate that
the labels mandated by the 1984 amendment to the Act were
inadequate; merely proving the inadequacy of labels prior to
1984 would not force manufacturers to change their present labels. Furthermore, a manufacturer might not change its warnings if it were not cost-effective to do so.2 30 Finally, there is

nothing in the Act barring manufacturers from independently
strengthening their warnings.231 Only successful tort actions that
would force manufacturers to adopt a nonuniform labeling
scheme, as opposed to a stronger nationally uniform labeling
scheme, would impede the purposes behind the Act. The circuit
courts rested their rulings on a worst-case scenario, a phenomenon to which the Hines doctrine lends itself. It is apparent that
courts utilizing the Hines doctrine can and will transform hypothetical conflicts into actual conflicts.
Second, as the Dewey court intimated, courts applying the
Hines test tend to overlook the compensatory goals of state tort
law.23 2 As the cigarette cases demonstrate, courts can view state
tort claims as an obstacle'under the Hines test solely because of
those state tort claims' possible regulatory effects without giving

ings Preempted Under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965:
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 754, 767 (1986).
228 Id.
22 Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1168 n.17. See also note 74 supra.
"0 See Garner, supra note 33, at 1454.
See Dewey, 121 N.J. at 90, 577 A.2d at 1249.
22 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 90-91, 577 A.2d at 1249.
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any consideration to the important purposes behind tort law.2 33
Affording an injured citizen a means of redress is a fundamental
duty of a state;23' to abrogate that duty because the citizen's
claim might stand as an obstacle to federal law is manifestly unfair to the state and the injured citizen. There is the distinct
danger of creating a remedial vacuum if state tort law is preempted. As a matter of policy, the purposes behind the state
tort law should be taken into account. Because the main purpose
behind state tort law is compensation, and the main purpose behind federal law is regulation, the two ought to coexist in the
absence of an "unambiguous mandate" to the contrary from
Congress. 23 5 Indeed, the other tests used by the Supreme Court
to analyze preemption take into account the purpose behind the
state law.23 6 Because the Hines test has a built-in blind spot re-

garding the compensatory goals of state tort law, it should not
be utilized when analyzing whether such claims are to be
preempted.
Finally, while the heightened presumption against preemption should, in theory, be sufficient to preserve most state common law claims peripherally at odds with federal law, the presumption has not held sway when courts utilize the Hines
doctrine.57 The cigarette cases provide a glaring example of
233 See notes 79-98 and accompanying text supra.
' See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 461, 479 A.2d 374, 390-91
(1984).
2u Admittedly, when the federal law has remedial provisions, this policy argument
has less force, because an injured party will be afforded a possibility to pursue a federal
remedy.
The Hines doctrine, however, is not needed to ensure that federal law with remedial provisions will retain their capacity to preempt state law. First, the presumption
against preemption is not as strong when the federal government provides for an alternative remedy, making it easier for remedial federal laws to preempt state law. Second, in
many instances where the federal law provides its own remedy, Congress has also "occupied the field" in that area, allowing courts to find preemption under an "occupy the
field" rationale. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 24245 (1959).
m See L TmBE, supra note 151, at 498 n.9 (noting that the Supreme Court takes
into account the purposes behind the state law when considering federal occupation of
the field). See also notes 244-47 infra.
For instance, a majority of the courts addressing whether tort claims based on
failure to equip cars with air bags are preempted have held that such claims are preempted by federal law under the Hines test. See Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865
F.2d 395, 400-02 (1st Cir. 1988) (claims based on failure to equip cars with passive restraints stand as an obstacle to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431, and the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards promulgated
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courts only nominally recognizing the presumption against preemption-the presumption is brushed aside when the circuit

courts engage in an "obstacle conflict" analysis. As mentioned in
section IIIA of this Comment, the presumption against preemp-

tion is at its acme in the cigarette cases, and still the circuit
courts glossed over the presumption. 3 8 Indeed, the courts seem
to have been seduced by the broad language of Hines, which
makes preemption sound so easy, and to have forgotten about
the caveat against preemption. Indeed, it is difficult to square

the heightened presumption against preemption with the Hines
"obstacle conflict" analysis in tort causes of action. Whereas the
presumption compels the party arguing preemption to make a
strong showing that Congress had a "clear and manifest" pur-

pose to preempt state law,239 the "obstacle conflict" analysis
places a seemingly much less onerous burden on the moving

party-to demonstrate that state law would somehow stand as
"an obstacle to the full purposes of Congress. 2 4 0 This irreconcilability with the presumption against preemption further warrants the abandonment of "obstacle conflict" analysis when state
common law claims are at issue.
A.

Other Categories of Preemption

The other tests typically invoked in preemption cases provide courts with more determinate frameworks than the Hines

test for analyzing whether Congress intended to preempt state
law.241 Accordingly, they afford state law greater protection. One

under the Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1391(2), 1392(a) (1982)).
2
See notes 150-62 and accompanying text supra.
229 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
24 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
241 Supreme Court preemption cases usually contain some version of the following:
It is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may preempt
state authority by so stating in express terms. Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress' intent to supercede state law altogether may be found from a
"'scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it,' because the
'Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
on the same subject,' or because 'the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed on it may reveal the same
purpose.'" Even where Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation in
a specific area, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts
with federal law. Such a conflict arises when "compliance with both federal
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such test, enunciated in FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, is whether "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physically impossibility. ' 2 2 This is essentially an
objective test: where a party complying with state law necessarily breaches federal law or vice-versa, state law must be preempted. Under the FloridaLime test, it is clear that state tort
actions would not be preempted by the Act because it is not
physically impossible for a manufacturer to comply with the labeling statute and simultaneously pay tort damages. 2 3 Another
standard test is whether Congress intended to "occupy the field"
in a given area to the exclusion of state law. Such intent may be
inferred either if the federal interest in the area is dominant, or
if there is a pervasive scheme of federal regulation in the area.24
The requirement that the federal interest in the specified area
be dominant gives a court firm guidelines: There are a limited
number of peculiarly national concerns. 245 Determining whether
the federal law is so pervasive as to preempt state law is somewhat less scientific. 246 Nonetheless, the test protects state law to
and state regulations is a physical impossibility," or where state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (citations omitted).
242 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). The Court determined that a California regulation
which prohibited avocados containing less than 8% oil by weight from being sold in the
state was not preempted by a federal regulation that established different standards for
the marketability of avocados, giving no significance to oil weight.
While the Court did cite the Hines test, the Court seemed to rest its decision solely
on the ground that it was not "physically impossible" for a seller to comply with both
the federal standard and the state oil-content standard. 373 U.S. at 14142. See Rothschild, supra note 220, at 857 n.157.
Indeed, Rothchild has argued that, because it gives a clear, objective preemption
guideline to courts, the FloridaLime test is the best available preemption test. Id.
243 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1167 (1984).
244 The "dominant" federal interest and the "pervasive" federal scheme tests are
both found in dictum in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (An
"Act of Congress may touch a field in which federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.").
2' See Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTMGS
CONST. LQ. 69, 103 (1988) (suggesting that the level of federal interest in the law in
question is an appropriate method of analyzing preemption in part because there are a
manageable number of federal concerns).
248 This type of "occupation of the field" analysis has had its detractors. "Mletaphor---'occupied the field'-has at times done service for close analysis." Bethlehem
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a greater extent than does the Hines doctrine because it takes
into account the purposes behind the state law, requiring courts
to preserve state laws that have a different purpose from the
federal law.247 Finally, Congress can expressly preempt state
law.248 What Congress expressly preempts provides courts with
the best indication of what Congress intended to preempt, giving
courts the firmest grounds on which to rest their holdings.2 49
That these tests are more rigorous than the Hines test is
apparent: None of the circuit courts found the inadequate warning claims preempted under these tests. But preemption doctrine is only as strong as its weakest link, the Hines doctrine. As
long as the Hines doctrine remains a staple in the vocabulary of
preemption, courts will always be able to exploit a flawed doctrine to invent grounds on which state law can be said to stand
as an impermissible obstacle to federal law.
V.

OTHER CONCERNS RAISED BY THE CIGARETTE CASES

This Comment, while applauding the Dewey decision and
urging a modification of existing preemption doctrine to better
safeguard state tort claims, does not overlook several practical
considerations that undoubtedly influenced the circuit court
opinions. 250 First, it is questionable whether any of these cigaSteel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 782 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
"Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often repeated formula
that Congress 'by occupying the field' has excluded from it all state legislation." Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the pervasive federal scheme "occupation of the field" test may dissolve into
question begging. Having determined that Congress intended to occupy the field, the
court must next determine what the field encompasses. See Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at
1164.
2'7 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Day.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 216 (1983) (discussed fully in notes 168-73 and accompanying
text supra). The Court held that the state's purpose in enacting the regulation was the
touchstone in determining whether the federal law occupied the field: if the state's purpose was not the same as the purpose behind the federal law, the state law would not be
preempted. Thus, it seems that after Pacific Gas, whether a federal law occupies the
field of state common law actions turns largely on whether the federal law sets up its
own remedial scheme.
348 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
249 See Wolfson, supra note 245, at 111-14 (noting that federal courts can best protect states' interests by requiring Congress to expressly preempt state law in most cases).
2"0 See Kim, supra note 173, at 827-28 (noting that the circuit courts' awareness of
the assumption of risk defense and their concern about exposing the cigarette industry
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rette injury suits could succeed on the merits.2 5 1 Plaintiffs will
have difficulties proving that the federally mandated warnings
are inadequate. 52 There is also a strong argument that these
plaintiffs assumed the risks of smoking. 5 3 Second, there is the
legitimate fear that, if successful, such claims would flood the
courts and create judicial chaos.2 Finally, there is the related

to potentially enormous tort liability lay behind the preemption decision); Henderson &
Twerski, DoctrinalCollapse in ProductsLiability: The Empty Shell of Failureto Warn,
65 N.Y.U. L Rv. 265, 321-22 (1990) (suggesting that the logical explanation behind the
decisions in favor of preemption is that the courts feared that cigarette inadequate warning claims would overload the judicial system).
211 See Crist & Majoras, supra note 2, at 582-602 (arguing that the tobacco plaintiffs' theories of liability are seriously defective as a matter of state law).
The district court in Cipollone conceded that it would be "extremely difficult for a
plaintiff to prove that the present warning is inadequate." 593 F. Supp. at 1148. Similarly, the Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized that the plaintiffs' claims would be
"difficult to prove." Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691, 701 (Minn.
App. 1988).
25 Forster,423 N.W.2d at 701.
s The First Circuit noted that cigarette smoking is a "voluntary activity." Palmer
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627 (1st Cir. 1987). The Sixth Circuit, in affirming a
district court order directing a verdict in favor of R.J. Reynolds on plaintiffs' design
defect claim, pointed out that the risks of smoking are "common knowledge." RoyAdon v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 1988).
See generally RESTATEMEwr (SEcOND) oF Tomirs § 402A comment n (1965), which
provides in part: ". . . the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily
and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under
the name assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict
liability."
See also Note, Tobacco Suits Today: Are CigarettePlaintiffsJust Blowing Smoke?,
23 U. Ricm L REa. 257, 268 (1989) (noting that the assumption of risk defense is bolstered by the existence of warning labels); but cf. Note, supra note 33, at 810 (arguing
that while cigarette litigation seems to offer the paradigmatic case for a successful plaintiff conduct defense, the doctrinal requirements of assumption of risk, specific knowledge
of the risk and voluntariness, may not be met in these cases).
25 See Palmer, 825 F.2d at 627 (describing the procedural "confusion" that would
be engendered if inadequate warning claims were allowed to proceed).
See also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 250, at 322 (maintaining that the courts
are convinced that a flood of cigarette litigation will ensue if post-1965 claims are not
preempted).
In addition, the specter of the asbestos litigation hovers over the cigarette cases.
This fear of a replay of the asbestos litigation is all the more palpable considering that
asbestos and cigarette manufacturers have, on many occasions, been co-defendants in
cancer suits. See, e.g., Gunsalus v. Celotex, 674 F. Supp. 1149, 1151 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(plaintiff alleging that the synergistic effect of working with substantial amounts of asbestos and smoking cigarettes caused him to develop lung cancer). The asbestos crisis
has succeeded in both backlogging the courts and bankrupting the industry. Jenkins v.
Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986). It is estimated that 21 million workers have been exposed to significant quantities of asbestos since 1940. Taking into ac-
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concern that a string of victories for the plaintiffs in these cases
could bankrupt the cigarette industry and wreak economic
chaos.255
Existing preemption doctrine, however, should not be
broadened to dispatch these troublesome claims.256 Rather, there
are alternative means of curbing cigarette litigation if Congress
or the states deem it necessary to do so-means that do not involve tampering with preemption doctrine or the principles of
federalism. First, Congress can amend the Act and expressly
preempt state tort claims.2 57 The Act has been amended before,
in 1970 and 1984, and it can be amended again whenever Congress wills. Second, the states themselves can always curb cigarette litigation through legislative action. California, for instance, widely considered to be a leader in the development of
product liability law, 258 has effectively curtailed cigarette litiga-

count that there are currently 54 million smokers in the United States, the effect of a
cigarette litigation crisis could overshadow the chaos engendered by the asbestos crisis.
See Ausness, supra note 11, at 958-960.
255 See Ausness, supra note 11, at 956 (discussing the possible economic ramifications if cigarette companies are found liable in these cases).
The dissent in Dewey voiced concerns that plaintiffs might use offensive collateral
estoppel to facilitate recovery in these actions, increasing the potential liability of cigarette manufacturers. Dewey, 121 N.J. at 102 n.3, 577 A.2d at 1259 n.3 (Antell, J., dissenting). Offensive collateral estoppel would preclude a defendant from relitigating issues
decided against it in a previous suit. However, the courts will probably not allow plaintiffs to use offensive collateral estoppel in the cigarette cases, because issues litigated in
earlier suits would not be identical to issues presented in the case at hand. Ausness,
supra note 11, at 967-68.
28' Tribe, supra note 136, at 790. Professor Tribe spelled out the possible effects of
the circuit courts' rulings:
It is the broadest ramifications of the Third Circuit's ruling which are the
most ominous. That court's view of preemption has the burning force of a prairie fire and it is hard to see what structures of state compensation would survive the ensuing conflagration. Food, drugs, cosmetics and toxic substances are
all governed in some manner by Federal warning laws. If innocent people are
injured because of inadequate warnings, or because advertisements downplay
the product's dangers, are all of them barred by Federal law from pursuing tort
claims in state court? If so, the circuit court's ruling is cause for a knowing
snicker in corporate board rooms across the country.
Id.
"' The amendment process gives Congress the final word on any preemption issue,
allowing it to deal with potential litigation crises by expressly preempting state tort law.
See Rothschild, supra note 220, at 858; Wolfson, supra note 245, at 103. This is entirely
in keeping with dictum in Dewey which notes that the only true indication of what Congress intended to preempt is what Congress expressly preempted in the statute or
regulation.
28 See Note, The Product Liability Provision of the Civil Liability Reform Act of
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tion in the state through tort reform. 0 9 Kansas, Louisiana, New
Jersey, Ohio and Tennessee have also enacted laws that presumably bar some claims against cigarette manufacturers. 20 Fur1987: An Evaluation of Its Impact and Scope, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1449, 1449 (1989).
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.45 (West Supp. 1989). Section 1714.45 provides:
(a) In a product liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall not be liable
if:
(1) The product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be
unsafe by the ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community;, and
(2) The product is a common consumer product intended for personal consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco and butter,
as identified in comment i to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "product liability action" means
any injury or death caused by a product, except that the term does not include
an action based on a manufacturing defect or breach of express warranty.
(c) This section is intended to be declarative of and does not alter or
amend existing California law, including Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.
3d 121 (1972), and shall apply to all product liability actions pending on, or
commenced after, January 1, 1988.
In American Tobacco v. Superior Ct., a California appellate court held that section
1714.45 gives cigarette manufacturers immunity from liability. 208 Cal. App. 3d 480, 486,
255 Cal. Rptr. 280, 282 (1989). The effect has been dramatic: while thirty-five suits were
pending against tobacco defendants in California in 1986, that number stands at zero
today. See Glick & Escher, Personal Choice and Civil Code Section 1714.45: An Epilogue for California'sSmoking and Health Litigation,25 CAm. W.L. REv. 239, 239 (1989);
Levin, Tobacco Industry Unharmed by Landmark Defeat in Smoker Death Case, L.A.
Times, Dec. 31, 1989, at A41, coL 1.
2eo KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3305 (1981) provides:
In any product liability claim any duty on the part of the manufacturer or
seller of the product to warn or protect against a danger or hazard which could
or did arise in the use or misuse of such a product, and any duty to have
properly instructed in the use of such product shall not extend:
(c) to warnings, protecting against or instructing with regard to dangers,
hazards or risks which are patent, open or obvious and which should have been
realized by a reasonable user or consumer of the product.
LA REv. STAT. ANN. § 2800.57(B) (West 1988) provides:
A manufacturer is not required to provide an adequate warning about his
product when:
(1) The product is not dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary user or handler of the product, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to the product's characteristics; or
(2) The user or handler of the product already knows or reasonably should be
expected to know of the characteristic of the product that may cause damage
and the danger of such characteristic.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A58C-3(a)2 (West 1987) provides in part:
In any product liability action against a manufacturer or seller for harm allegedly caused by a product that was designed in a defective manner, the manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if.
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thermore, several states have judicially incorporated comment i
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A into their
tort law, making it difficult for a plaintiff to bring a successful
product liability action against cigarette manufacturers. 20

1

Al-

lowing the states individually to determine whether to limit such
tort claims is the solution to a possible cigarette litigation
crisis
22
most in keeping with the principles of federalism.
CONCLUSION

On December 24, 1990, Brown & Williamson announced
that it would not ask the United States Supreme Court to review the Dewey decision. 6 3 However, four days later, the plaintiffs' attorneys in the Cipollone case filed a petition for certiorari, challenging the Third Circuit's findings that the Act
preempts post-1965 cigarette injury claims based on failure to
warn and intentional misrepresentation.2 4 Then, on March 1,
1991, in a turnabout, the tobacco company defendants in the Ci-

(2) The characteristics of the product are known to the ordinary consumer or
user, and the harm caused by an unsafe aspect of the product that is an inherent characteristic of the product and that would be recognized by the ordinary
person who uses or consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge common to the class of persons for whom the product is intended ....
OHIO Ray. CODE ANN. § 2307.76 (B) (Baldwin 1989) provides:
A product is not defective due to lack of warning or instruction or inadequate
warning or instruction as a result of the failure of its manufacturer to warn or
instruct about an open and obvious risk or a risk that is a matter of common
knowledge.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-105(d) (1980) provides:
A product is not unreasonably dangerous because of failure to adequately warn
of a danger or hazard that is apparent to the ordinary user.
261 Tennessee, for instance, has judicially adopted comment i of the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds, 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191
(D.C. Tenn. 1985), aff'd. 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988). The Roysdon court accordingly
directed a verdict on plaintiffs' design defect claim. Id.
22 Tribe, supra note 136, at 790. Professor Tribe noted:
[I]t is true that such litigation is highly controversial. Like the cigarette cases,
the food and drug cases have been criticized by some as excessive and wasteful.
But in our Federal system, reform of litigious excesses should ordinarily come
from the states. If state legislatures and courts decide to act to limit or constrain recovery, that is their prerogative. For a federal appellate court to draw
a cloak of immunity over such cases is to overstep its place in our Federal
scheme.
Id.
202 Tobacco Company Won't Ask Review, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1990, at 45, col. 2.
20 19 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 3 (Jan. 4, 1991).
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pollone litigation filed a brief supporting the plaintiffs' petition

for certiorari.

e5 In

asking for Supreme Court review, both sides

noted that the split between the New Jersey Supreme Court in

Dewey and the Third Circuit in Cipollone subjected litigants in
New Jersey to two conflicting standards depending on whether

such claims were filed in state or federal court.

6

On March 25,

certiorari. 6 7

the Supreme Court granted
The Court is expected
to issue a final decision in the spring of 1992.268 If the Court

follows the trend it has set in its recent holdings in ruling on the
merits, it should find, as the Dewey court did, that the Act does
not preempt plaintiffs' post-1965 inadequate warning and inten-tional misrepresentation claims. It is also an opportunity for the
Court to address the dangers inherent in the Hines doctrine.
Certainly a holding that the Act does not preempt failure to

warn and intentional misrepresentation claims is not troublefree. Cigarette injury claims are highly controversial to begin
with, given the strong argument that many of these plaintiffs

chose to smoke at their own risk. Nor do the courts want another asbestos crisis on their hands. However, a finding that
such claims are preempted would have a far more damaging effect. Such a holding might well lead to the broadening of the
preemption defense and a corresponding curtailment of the
states' ability to fashion remedies for their injured citizens in
many areas, such as food and drugs, which are governed in large
part by federal warning laws. In the absence of a clear congressional intent to preempt such tort claims, injured citizens should

2"6 Marcus

& Lambert, Tobacco Liability Case Nears High Court, Wall St. J., Mar.
4, 1991, at B6, col 4.
268 TOBACCO ON TaL, Jan. 15, 1991, at 2 (noting that the plaintiffs' petition pointed
out the direct conflict between the New Jersey Supreme Court and the Third Circuit on
the preemption issue); TOBACCO ON TRL, Mar. 15, 1991, at 1 (noting that the tobacco
companies agreed that the current situation in New Jersey is intolerable).
26 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386
(1991).
The importance of the Supreme Court's decision to hear the case was not lo3t on the
press. "This is the high court's first venture into a high-stakes controversy that will have
enormous ramifications for the tobacco industry. If the tobacco companies vn, the ruling will sharply limit the number of personal injury lawsuits filed by smokers or their
families. If the smokers win, the decision may spark hundreds of lawsuits by smokers
against tobacco firms." Wermeil, Supreme Court Will Consider Tobacco Issue, Wall St.
J., Mar. 26, 1991, at A3, col. 1. The financial community also reacted sharply to the news
as tobacco company stocks tumbled. Id.
"6 Wermeil, supra note 267.
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at least be given the opportunity to bring them. Any other result
would fly in the face of the principles of federalism.
Sven Krogius

